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MONGOLIA, LAW CONVERGENCE, AND THE 
THIRD ERA OF GLOBALIZATION* 
DANIELLE CONWAY-JONES** 
PROLOGUE 
In the Spring of 2002, I received a call from a colleague in the School 
of Hawaiian, Asian, and Pacific Studies at the University of Hawai’i at 
Mānoa. My colleague wanted to gauge my interest in joining a university 
delegation to travel to Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia at the request of the 
Mongolian Government and the Academy of Management. The invitation 
was the result of an agreement between the Academy of Management, a 
Mongolian graduate and doctoral degree-granting institution and the 
University of Hawai’i to produce the Globalization and Development in 
Mongolia Joint Conference. Globalization peaked my interest almost as 
much as the prospect of visiting a former socialist country that, as recently 
as 1992, embraced a constitutional democracy anchored by the rule of law. 
I accepted the invitation and began preparing my thoughts on the newest 
era of globalization in one of the newest functioning democracies in the 
world. 
As I made general preparations to travel to Mongolia, I was struck by 
how far many countries, including Mongolia, have come in transitioning 
to a market economy. Having read William E. Kovacic’s account of the 
 
 
 * This Article was originally prepared for the Joint Conference on Globalization and 
Development in Mongolia held at the Mongolian Government House, July 4-5, 2002. It has since been 
edited and expanded. It is republished here with the permission of the Academy of Management. 
 Represented at the Conference were The Distinguished Secretary of the Parliament of Mongolia, 
the Head of the Cabinet, Members of Parliament, the Director of the Academy of Management of 
Mongolia, the Interim Chancellor of the University of Hawai’i, and Faculty and Presenters from both 
the Academy of Management and the University of Hawai’i. 
 ** Associate Professor of Law, University of Hawai’i, William S. Richardson School of Law. 
B.S. New York University Stern School of Business; J.D., Howard University School of Law; LL.M., 
George Washington University Law School. This author must thank R. Hokulei Lindsey, Esq. for her 
superior research assistance during the preparation of this article, prior manuscripts, and the 
development of presentation materials. Without Ms. Lindsey’s substantial and insightful contributions, 
my work on the Mongolia Law Convergence Project would never have materialized. In addition, I 
must thank Lama Bataa Mishigish for his exceptional translations of my works from English to 
Mongolian. I also must thank the University of Hawai’i at Mānoa System Administration, especially 
Interim Vice President for Academic Affairs Deane Neubauer, Dean Willa Tanabe, Interim Dean 
Edgar Porter, Dr. Richard Pratt, and Dean Lawrence Foster for their financial support and friendship. 
Finally, I wish to thank the Government of Mongolia and the Academy of Management for presenting 
the unique opportunity to learn about, discuss, and analyze global issues impacting their profoundly 
beautiful country.  
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long journey to Mongolia,1 I was ready for almost anything—anything but 
a ten minute Internet search yielding three different itineraries for the 
sojourn from Honolulu, Hawai’i to Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia. In what 
seemed to me just one day of planning, I virtually connected to Korean 
Air, which offered me a one-stop flight to the land-locked agrarian country 
of Mongolia. The only bump was arranging travel during the Mongolian 
National Holiday called Naadam.2 The simple experience of making travel 
arrangements provided a wonderful backdrop for my research regarding 
Mongolia’s quest to study globalization, the Western rule of law, and the 
impact both of these principles have and will continue to have on 
Mongolia’s young, yet successful constitutional democracy. In one day of 
preparation, I linked the islands of Hawai’i to Ulaanbaatar through the 
Internet, completed an airline transaction between Hawai’i and Seoul, 
South Korea, and learned about Mongolia’s national cultural event called 
Naadam, which celebrates, among other things, the People’s Revolution of 
1921. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is no more difficult a task to undertake than a discussion of the 
maximum optimal law regime that a nation-state should adhere to in an era 
of globalization and law convergence. Some truths, however, are 
 
 
 1. As recently as 1993, Professor Kovacic begins his accounts of his travel to Ulaanbaatar as 
follows: 
For travelers from the United States, few destinations are more remote in culture or locale than 
Ulaanbaatar. From North America, reaching the capital of Mongolia usually involved an eleven-
hour flight across the Pacific to Tokyo, a connecting five-hour leg to Beijing, and a concluding 
two-hour hop over northern China and the Gobi Desert in a fully-depreciated aircraft bulging with 
Chinese, Mongolian, and Russian merchants and their hand-carried wares. The long journey, 
austere accommodations, and extended, arduous winters, deter casual visitors. 
William E. Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law Reform in Formerly Communist 
and Socialist Countries, 11 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 437, 437 (1996). 
 2. Little seen by most outsiders throughout its history, Naadam has continued in modern times 
under the watchful eyes of observers from Russia and China, who split the Mongolian nation in half in 
the 1920s. See Ron Gluckman, The Alternative Olympics, http://www.gluckman.com/Naadam.html 
(last visited Oct. 15, 2003). In the Chinese-ruled region of Inner Mongolia, Naadam festivals have 
been held irregularly, often secretly and in outlying areas, due to official bans imposed periodically on 
displays of native culture. Id. In the Republic of Mongolia, which in 1990 became Central Asia’s first 
democracy, the mid-summer festival was initiated by Genghis Kahn in the 12th Century. Id. Even 
under Soviet rule, Naadam remained the Mongol main event, slyly scheduled to begin July 11, for 
seven decades known as National Day, commemorating the People’s Revolution of 1921, which made 
Mongolia the second communist republic after Russia. Id. Mongolia’s more recent democratic 
revolution marked the departure of the former Soviet hosts and opened the festival to western eyes for 
the first time. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss1/3
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immutable. Legal and judicial reform has intrinsic worth and value and a 
strong, apolitical judicial system can foster the protection of people, land, 
and economies.3 Another truth—democratic countries are challenged when 
it comes to creating, maintaining, and evolving sound laws and regulations 
for the proper governing of their societies.4 More so than ever, nation-
states are either pushing for or being pushed into participating in the 
newest era of globalization.5 It is this push that is the driving force behind 
global law reform and, in some instances, law hegemony.6  
Ultimately, the question of law reform is one of will and desire. The 
perceived desirable outcome for a nation-state is the starting and ending 
places that will dictate the reception or adoption of part or all of a legal 
tradition, with a specific system and norms. Is the desired outcome a 
flexible legal system, capable of untold growth through experience and 
evolution? Or, is it an authoritative, coherent, and controlled system, 
capable of almost immediate certainty, at least in previously–conceived 
fact situations? Or, even more elusive, is there some magic combination of 
legal traditions and systems that can optimally address a nation—state’s 
quest for law reform and facilitate democracy, open markets, and public 
law development to maximize, in the most positive manner, a nation-
state’s impact in the domestic as well as global communities? Responding 
 
 
 3. See J. Brady Anderson, Promoting the Rule of Law Around the World, TRIAL, Nov. 2000, at 
84 (concluding that “[i]mproving legal systems in developing countries is in the U.S. interest.”). By 
improving legal systems, developing countries can stimulate new trade, which attracts foreign, 
particularly Western, investment. See Matthew Stephenson, Economic Development and the Quality of 
Legal Institutions, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/institutional.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 
2003). 
 4.  See Tom Ginsburg & Gombosuren Ganzorig, When Courts and Politics Collide: Mongolia’s 
Constitutional Crisis, 14 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 309, 309 (2001). The authors, one of whom is a former 
judge of the Supreme Court of Mongolia, state: “Mongolia’s political system has received well-
deserved attention as one of the most successful examples of democratization in the Asian region.” Id. 
The authors premise such praise on the fact that “Mongolia has undergone peaceful constitutional 
change and has conducted several democratic elections.” Id. In addition, in Mongolia, “[h]uman rights 
are well-respected, the media is free and political competition exists.” Id. 
 5. The newest era of globalization is a form of domination and colonization driven by 
technological innovation and the spread of Western cultural ideas, images, fads, and consumerism. See 
Thalif Deen, “Coca-Colonization” of the Third World, INTERPRESS SERVICE, (July 2, 1999), 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/special/cocacola.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2003). While 
developing nations are pushed into participation in the global market place of information, finance, 
and technology, ultimately it is a losing game. Despite the promise of globalization, not only is there 
uneven distribution of access to technology-based information, developed nations have also wielded 
their economic muscle to create the rules of the game, largely on a “take it or leave” it basis. Maxwell 
O. Chibundu, Globalizing the Rule of Law: Some Thoughts at and on the Periphery, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL 
LEGAL STUD. 79, 110-13 (1999). 
 6. Ultimately, only certain areas of the law are truly amenable to homogenization because such 
conflation in these areas would not offend or destroy culture, ideology, and natural law evolution in a 
defined society. See infra notes 56-68 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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to any of these questions, as they relate to Mongolia, requires an analysis 
of the family of legal traditions, with insight into the perceived similarities 
and differences. In turn, a discussion of the concept of globalization and 
the impact that it has on law reform and the development and 
sustainability of the rule of law in Mongolia should follow. Finally, some 
attention must be paid to those areas of law reform research that will 
benefit Mongolia in the long term. Regardless of the points covered 
herein, in today’s global community law reform occurs mainly under the 
aegis of those within the internal system of government and the legal 
community. Therefore, law reformers in Mongolia must be the sponsors of 
the important issues to be researched and discussed in the future so as to 
correspond to the will and desires of the Mongolian people. 
II. LEGAL TRADITIONS 
Legal traditions are sharply distinct from legal systems. A legal 
tradition “is a set of deeply rooted, historically conditioned attitudes about 
the nature of law, about the role of law in the society and the polity, about 
the proper organization and operation of a legal system, and about the way 
law is or should be made, applied, studied, perfected, and taught.”7 On the 
other hand, legal systems are the vehicles by which various individual 
nation-states, exercising and encouraging nationalism and sovereignty, 
characterize and implement their respective traditions.8 Many legal 
traditions are in force across the globe, ranging from civil law, common 
law, and socialist law to Hindu law, Scandinavian law, Islamic law, and 
Indigenous Peoples’ customary law.9 Because the civil law and common 
law traditions are in force in powerful, technologically advanced nation-
states, many developing countries involved in the global marketplace of 
information, finance, and technology are considering some level of 
implementation of these particular traditions.10 It is, therefore, critical to 
analyze these traditions to determine whether implementation within 
Mongolia is necessary or even desirable. 
 
 
 7. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL 
SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 2 (2d ed. 1985). 
 8.  Id. at 1-2. In other words, a legal system represents the rules, procedures, and institutions 
that exist within a particular government, whereas a legal tradition represents the ideology upon which 
that particular system is based. See id. 
 9. Id. at 4-5. 
 10.  Cf. Rumu Sarkar, The Legal Implications of Financial Sector Reform in Emerging Capital 
Market, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 705, 723-24 (1998) (advocating a balance between a developing 
country’s traditional legal customs and the adoption of Western forms of legal thought). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss1/3
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A. Similarities Between Civil Law and Common Law Traditions 
The civil law tradition owes much of its origin to “Roman civil law, 
canon law, and commercial law.”11 The civil law tradition is premised 
upon a distinct ideology that reveres the unity of the state and the 
supremacy of legal certainty.12 Civil law rests on the promotion of the 
legislature.13 Thus, the very nature of the civil law tradition provides an 
unparalleled degree of clarity, completeness, and coherence in known or 
knowable circumstances. Inherently, the civil law tradition also provides a 
certain modicum of fairness because individuals within a civil law nation-
state can feel confident about an outcome.14 Certainty, so derived, surely 
has its successes, but can also count appreciably its weaknesses. 
Despite its similarities to the common law tradition, the civil law 
tradition has a distinct ideology, one that elevates the very tradition to 
dogma and seeks to replace or nullify prior law or any existing interpretive 
law.15 With this ideology in mind, it is critical to assess the viability of the 
 
 
 11.  See MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 6 (stating “[t]he civil law tradition is a composite of 
several distinct subtraditions, with separate origins and developments in different periods of history.”). 
These subtraditions are usually described as “Roman civil law, canon law, commercial law, the 
revolution, and legal science.” Id. Roman law, compiled under Justinian in the sixth century A.D., 
dealt with “the law of persons, the family, inheritance, property, torts, unjust enrichment, and contracts 
and the remedies by which interests falling within these categories [received] judicial[] protect[ion].” 
Id. It is commonly held among those in the civil law tradition “that this group of subjects is a related 
body of law that constitutes the fundamental content of the legal system . . . and it is one of the 
principal distinguishing marks of what common lawyers call the civil law system.” Id. Canon law is a 
“body of law and procedure” that was developed for and by the Roman Catholic Church and its 
members. Id. at 10-11. Commercial law developed around the European commerce throughout the 
Mediterranean and drew from practical application of the interests of merchants rather than the 
compilations of scholars. Id. at 12-13. 
 12. See id. at 48 (linking certainty in a civil law tradition to clear, complete, judge-proof 
legislation). The civil law is premised on state positivism such that the state, as the absolute source of 
law, has a lawmaking monopoly and the role of the judiciary is limited to the application of codes. Id. 
at 22. Accordingly, certainty in law is achieved through a complete code without gaps or conflicting 
provisions, which would require judicial interpretation. Id. at 29. 
 13. See id. at 23 (“[T]he accepted theory of sources of law in the civil law tradition recognizes 
only statutes, regulations, and custom . . . .”). A strict emphasis on separation of powers, stemming 
from French Revolutionary thought, demands that only the legislature has the power to make law. Id. 
at 22. However, as the supreme lawmaking power, the legislature can delegate its power to 
administrative agencies, thus giving administrative regulations force of law. Id. at 23. Similarly, 
custom is recognized only to the extent that there is no existing applicable statute or regulation 
contrary. Id. 
 14. See id. at 48 (“Legislation should be clear, complete, and coherent. . . The process of 
interpretation and application should be as automatic as possible. . . .”). In contrast to the common law 
tradition where equity is achieved through stare decisis and judicial discretion, in a civil law state 
equitable powers are exercised by the legislature. Id. at 48-50. Equitable powers are exercised in two 
ways; the legislature can “specifically delegate that power [to the judiciary] in carefully defined 
situations” or it can “enact rules of equity for the judge to apply like other rules.” Id. at 52. 
 15.  See id. at 20-22. Fueled by revolutionary change on the European continent and the 
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civil law tradition in the context of spreading federalism, 
constitutionalism, and continous competition. In its purest form, the civil 
law tradition provides an authoritative response from a legislature 
responsible for portending and then enacting appropriate legislation to 
prescribe general conduct for particular circumstances. The legislature’s 
actions to set and enforce the rules handed down to the masses work well 
in the absence of special relationships or circumstances. However, in this 
era of globalization, special relationships and circumstances are the norm 
rather than the exception. Along with the normative regime of special 
interests and relationships comes special interest laws.16 One area of 
special interest, for example, is the protection and enforcement of rights in 
intellectual property. Whether prompted by the desire to be a member of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO) or just by the desire to be a part of 
the global economic and trade community, a nation-state must provide a 
certain level of protection for the intellectual property of its owners 
whether foreign or domestic. Under the pure civil law tradition, a state 
would be restricted to acting in the role of a referee, with a mandate to 
enforce the rules of the game. However, the WTO, alone, is an amalgam 
of policy and compromise intended to promote specific economic 
interests. Thus, in providing protection for intellectual property in 
accordance with WTO protocol, the new role of the civil law state actor 
becomes fundamentally distinct in ideology from its pure predecessor.17 
The common law tradition dates back to the Norman conquest of 
England in 1066, but not until the late fifteenth century did the common 
 
 
concomitant desire to end the social and economic injustice of the old feudal order, the ideology of 
nationalism and state sovereignty emerged. Id. at 19. All other sources of law were largely eschewed 
in favor of the ultimate lawmaking power of the legislature. Id. at 20. 
 16.  See Chibundu, supra note 5, at 108-10 (analyzing the application of “national treatment” and 
“most favored nation” status in multi-lateral agreements). 
Enshrined most prominently in GATT, [most favored nation status] permits flexibility and 
discrimination in interstate negotiations, while requiring that the end-product of such negotiations 
be evenly applied to all members of the “club.” A State gives only as much as it is willing, or able, 
to give to the whole, on the basis of its own calculated interests (including, of course, what it 
expects in reciprocity from its conduct), not on some uniform appeal to a standard or mean that 
represents a “second” or “third” best choice. Having settled on a standard, however, a State under 
MFN is then obliged to apply that standard to all other group members without regard to the level 
of reciprocal benefits from each individual State. Thus, MFN simultaneously recognizes and 
furthers the interest of each State in determining for itself the level of engagement with foreign 
States, while denying that State the capacity to choose (to discriminate insidiously) among the 
beneficiaries of that engagement. 
Id. at 111. 
 17.  See MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 24 (describing modern tendencies and the erosion of the 
strict conception of what law is in a civil law state). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss1/3
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law resemble firm body of legal principles.18 The common law tradition is 
based upon dispute resolution to achieve fairness and efficiency of results. 
Its strength lies in its very independence from an authoritative lawgiver 
who hands down law “in fixed and finite form.”19 Like the civil law 
tradition, the common law tradition recognizes the desirability of certainty, 
although common law certainty is not held up as dogma.20 Judge-made 
jurisprudence provides examples of the application of law and thereby 
establishes a range of resulting outcomes that can guide people in 
understanding their rights and obligations within a common law nation-
state.21 But akin to the civil law tradition, the common law tradition also 
 
 
 18.  Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect 4 
(2001), at http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/pistor-transplants.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 
2003). See also Sarkar, supra note 10, at 722. 
The common law concepts behind the ideas of private property, contracts, and corporate law are 
complex and stem from the historical experience of the West from the transition of feudalism to 
mercantile capitalism to more advanced forms of capitalism. These historical transitions occurred 
over the course of several centuries, not over the course of several years. 
Id. 
 19.  Calvin Woodard, Sir William Blackstone and Anglo-American Jurisprudence, in THE 
POLITICAL THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 67, 75 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1990). Unlike the 
origins of the civil law, the common law developed as a working legal system where “the task of 
prescribing rules defining the range of permissible individual behavior [was left] to the widely shared 
values of an insular people.” Id. at 74. Thus, 
[t]he “splendid isolation” in which the common law developed—in court rooms and trials—was 
both its glory, and the cause of its most glaring weakness. The “glory” was that it did not owe its 
existence to any single, determinate law-giver, divine, royal or otherwise, who handed it “down” 
in fixed and finite form. To a significant degree, the legal system developed a life of its own, 
dominated to be sure by the legal profession, but nevertheless relatively independent of political 
intervention because there was no “authoritative word” to which it was bound. 
Id. at 75. In fact, the common law “stemmed neither from God nor Nature nor any superhuman 
lawgiver. . . . [I]t was the ‘common law’ that had evolved, along with English society itself, from 
ancient custom.” Id. at 86.  
 20. See MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 48-49. Merryman identifies three primary differences 
between legal certainty as recognized in the civil law and the common law. Id. In the common law 
tradition: 
certainty is usually discussed in more functional terms, and is not elevated to the level of 
dogma. . . . [thus] recogniz[ing] that there are limits on the extent to which certainty is possible. 
Second, certainty is achieved in the common law by giving the force of law to judicial decisions, 
something theoretically forbidden in civil law. . . . Finally, in the common law world . . . it is more 
generally recognized that certainty is only one of a number of legal values, which sometimes 
conflict with each other. . . . In the common law, certainty and flexibility are seen as competing 
values, each tending to limit the other. In the civil law world, the supreme value is certainty, and 
the need for flexibility is seen as a series of “problems” complicating progress toward the ideal of 
judge-proof law. 
Id. See infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.  
 21. MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 49. Only after gradual development did it become possible to 
distinguish between procedural rules and substantive rules. Woodard, supra note 19, at 79. “The facts 
of various cases define the nature of the ‘wrong,’ and the courts, in the process of imposing liability 
and immunity . . . reflect certain general principles or rules that become progressively clearer and more 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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contains its fair share of weaknesses.  
Scholars have cited the unwieldy cataloguing and shelving of resource 
materials as one weakness of a law system premised upon the case method 
of dispute resolution.22 Because of the wave of technological 
advancement, many impediments to adopting common law tradition no 
longer exist. This is no longer the era of brick and mortar libraries. 
Libraries of information can be transmitted with the click of a button 
through the Internet, which is accessed via high-speed connections such as 
broad band. Search engine software provides indexing technology, which 
allows a user to engage in focused research to find applicable source 
materials. Myriad higher education institutions provide their resources to 
the global community at a minimal charge. However, the ready availability 
of resources is not the primary component to creating an effective law 
system premised on precedent. Nor is technology the most critical 
component for the success of a law system. The most important 
component of a law system, without question, will be the people for whom 
the system is created.23 As one Mongolian official stated, “New laws must 
be suited to our capabilities, experience, and circumstances. If new laws 
are to succeed, Mongolians will have to carry out the new laws. Do not 
forget the human dimension of reform.”24 
For a common law or hybrid tradition to be effective, those elected or 
appointed to work within the system must believe in it and comprehend 
their role within it. Under the common law, the judiciary has a unique and 
 
 
refined as they evolve through time.” Id. Interestingly, the very characteristic from which the common 
law now derives much of its certainty, was historically the source of much criticism. Lacking a 
definitive code, the common law appeared unknowable to anyone except members of the Inns of 
Court. Id. at 75-76. “The crude fact was that nobody, certainly no layman, could ever be sure what the 
‘law’ was until the courts spoke, and the judges could only speak in actual cases involving certain 
specific facts.” Id. at 76.  
 22. Paul H. Brietzke, Choice of Legal System Reforms in Mongolia, in “RECHTSREFORM UND 
DAS NATIONALE RECHTSSYSTEM”: INTERNATIONALES SYMPOSIUM [“LEGAL REFROM AND NATIONAL 
LEGAL SYSTEM”: INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM] 82, 86 (2000). 
 23. See Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 2. Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard explain that  
[f]irst, for the law to be effective, it must be meaningful in the context in which it is applied so 
citizens have an incentive to use the law and to demand institutions that work to enforce and 
develop the law [and, s]econd, the judges, lawyers, and other legal intermediaries that are 
responsible for developing the law must be able to increase the quality of the law in a way that is 
responsive to demand for legality.  
Id. 
 24. William E. Kovacic, Recent Development, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law 
Reform in Formerly Communist and Socialist Countries, 11 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 437, 438 
(1996) (quoting a Mongolian official who commented on the enthusiasm with which foreign 
consultants provide laws and regulations from their own countries to reforming and developing 
countries).  
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significant role to play within the nation-state. A strong judiciary does not 
necessarily mean a superior governmental actor; rather, a strong judiciary 
means an independent actor, free from political persuasion and, thus, free 
to dispense justice. The Constitution of Mongolia, in fact, established the 
model for a strong judiciary. Article 47 of the constitution expresses the 
separation of powers doctrine by stating that the “[e]xercise of judicial 
power by any other organization but courts shall be prohibited.”25 
Furthermore, Article 49 of the constitution ensures that the judiciary has 
equal power in the governance of the nation. It states that, “Judges shall be 
independent and subject only to law.”26 The significance of these two 
simple, yet powerful constitutional provisions is clear. Mongolia intends to 
raise the status of its judiciary and also intends to protect these public 
servants from politics, outside influence, or, in the worst case, corruption. 
While the common law tradition is not perfect, a strong judiciary, seeking 
justice with every ruling, is a formidable governmental entity, capable of 
evolving within the community as well as with other nation-states making 
up the global community. The flexibility and the equity that is so evident 
in the Mongolian Constitution is a hallmark of the common law tradition. 
B. Differences Between Civil Law and Common Law Traditions 
When American political scientist Martin Shapiro identified 
differences between civil law and common law traditions for purposes of 
characteristic comparisons, he observed that his identified differences 
were far more false than true.27 Specifically, Shapiro stated:  
For most areas of law in most countries . . . similarities overwhelm 
differences. . . . [S]ome authors may then seek the grail of universal 
legal principles derived from a universal moral or natural or 
categorical law, or international human rights, or the holy progress 
of the law, to meet universal human needs. To the less sanguine, the 
dominant similarities point only to the human concerns for security 
of person, mine and thine, and family that are indeed universal but 
are not necessarily moral, progressive or unifying. Others, more 
struck by the legal differences they observe, turn to adumbrating a 
global law divided into a number of families: common, civil, 
Islamic, Socialist, Confucian. . . . [M]ore sophisticated and subtle 
 
 
 25. MONG. CONST. ch. III, pt. IV, art. 47. 
 26. MONG. CONST. ch. III, pt. IV, art. 49. 
 27. Martin Shapiro, The Success of Judicial Review, in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 193 (Sally J. Kenney et al. eds., 1999). 
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analyses indicate[] that certain ranges of variation between the 
members of each family exceed[] that variation between families, 
that many observable entities exhibit a mix of the basic features of 
two or more families and that phenomena, which at one level and 
technique of observation appear strikingly different, at another 
appear quite similar.28 
There is no question that the civil law provides a measure of coherence, 
and this coherence buttresses the very ideology that a civil law tradition 
promotes—unity, nationalism, and simplicity. Additionally, the civil law 
tradition seeks to place more power in a legislature that is responsible for 
making law and less power in a judge responsible for applying the law.29 
Whether to demystify the law or to consolidate the power implicit in the 
function of lawmaking, the civil law tradition diminishes the authority of a 
judiciary to do little more than apply statutes to particular circumstances. 
The ideology of the common law tradition, however, does not augur well 
with the diminished authority of a judiciary to interpret the law and to use 
discretion only when necessary.30 Pursuant to the common law tradition, 
the judiciary is empowered to fill those gaps left open by the legislature, 
even though principles of separation of powers govern.31 Such gaps 
 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. See MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 35. The status and role of the civil law judge stems from 
the tradition’s Roman roots. Id. 
The judge . . . of Rome was not a prominent man of the law . . . . [H]e was, in effect, a layman 
discharging an arbitral function by presiding over the settlement of disputes according to formulae 
supplied by another official . . . . The judge had no inherent lawmaking power . . . .  
. . . . 
The net image is of the judge as an operator of a machine designed and built by legislators. His 
function is a mechanical one. . . .  
. . . . 
The result is that although there is a superficial similarity of function between the civil law judge 
and the common law judge, there are substantial disparities in their accepted roles.  
Id. at 35-37. 
 30. See Woodard, supra note 18, at 73-74 (describing the development of the common law as a 
“dispute-resolving process . . . promoting procedures and practices that enhanced the fairness and 
efficiency of its results.”). The common law developed from judge-made law, tempered by precedent 
and, eventually, stare decisis. See id. at 91. Today, common law judges have the power of judicial 
review of legislation and administrative action, interpretive power where statutes and rules are 
incomplete, as well as equtable powers. MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 34, 49, 51; see generally 
Shapiro, supra note 27 (discussing theories of judicial review). 
 31. See MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 48-49. While both the common law and civil law traditions 
recognize the doctrine of separation of powers, the concept has distinct implications for each. “In the 
United States and England . . . judges had often been a progressive force on the side of the individual 
against the abuse of power by the ruler.” Id. at 14. Thus, for the common law, separation of powers 
was a symbol of “‘judicial independence’ and a relatively apolitical ‘rule of law.’” See Woodard, 
supra note 19, at 75. Contemporary civil law theory, however, rooted in French Revolutionary 
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include legislative silence, conflicting legislative provisions, and 
ambiguous or confusing legislative provisions.32 In such cases, judges in 
the common law tradition perform the role of interpreter to provide 
equitable answers to impacted parties.33 Thus, the ideology of the common 
law tradition is to promote flexibility.  
This very ideology—promoting a legal system that develops through 
application and adaptation to analogous circumstances—is what gave birth 
to the phrase “the United States Constitution is elastic.”34 Such an elastic 
constitution changes for and with the times and lends itself to 
interpretation to respond to the needs of an evolving society. While 
flexibility and functional equity are the focal points of the common law 
tradition, they are directly at odds with the ideology of the civil law 
tradition.35 In the civil law tradition flexibility and certainty are in conflict, 
with the former placing power and control, equal to that of the legislature, 
in the hands of the judiciary. On the surface, the concept of flexibility 
appears antithetical to the principle of separation of powers, but such is not 
the case in modern, global society.36 All branches of a democratic 
government have lawmaking roles. In this regard, level of equality ensures 
the existence of checks and balances, which ultimately benefit the citizens 
of that democracy. While such flexibility has the potential to create a more 
complex legal system, other balancing mechanisms exist within the 
executive and legislative branches to provide clarity and insight.37 
 
 
thought, employs separation of powers to ensure the supremacy of legislative law-making authority 
and “to prevent intrusion of the judiciary into areas—lawmaking and the execution of the laws—
reserved to the other two powers.” MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 15. 
 32. Cf. id. at 43. Merryman explains that while “the text of a statute remains unchanged, its 
meaning and application often change in response to social pressures.” Id. Additionally, future 
problems arise which the statute cannot portend. Id. In such a climate, the judiciary must have some 
inherent lawmaking authority to fill the gaps left by the legislature. Id. 
 33. Id.  
 34. Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution is called the “elastic clause” because this 
principle allows the legislature and the courts to reinterpret and readapt the laws of the nation to the 
needs of an evolving society. Specifically, the elastic clause states that Congress shall have the 
authority “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” the 
various powers allotted to the federal government by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 35. See MERRYMAN, supra note 7, at 22 (explaining the civil law tradition’s emphasis on 
separation of powers). 
 36. See Stephenson, supra note 3 (weighing the value of credibility and flexibility of legal 
institutions in a developing economy). 
 37. In Article I, Section I of the United States Constitution, all legislative powers are vested in 
Congress. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § I. This power is offset by the executive branch’s power to implement 
legislation. Roberto Iraola, Congressional Oversight, Executive Privilege, and Requests for 
Information Relating to Federal Criminal Investigations and Prosecutions, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1559, 
1564 (2002). The final authority as to whether “the executive or legislative branch exceeds [its] 
authority” is the judicial branch. Id. Agencies, as part of the legislative branch, are also vested with 
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C. Modern Overlap 
Returning to the earlier premise that common law and civil law 
traditions are more alike than different, one need only look to the 
following: the trend towards federalism in Europe; the spread of 
constitutionalism across the globe; and the increase in decodification in 
civil law countries for economic purposes, to appreciate that civil law and 
common law traditions are collapsing into each other in the wave of global 
integration.38 The fact that civil law nation-states are enacting legislation 
by pointing to special policy interests and common law nation-states are 
attempting to achieve uniformity through either domestic codification of 
laws or commitment to treaties is not necessarily reflective of purely 
national interests. These trends signal a desire and willingness to integrate 
globally by defining a workable way in which domestic and foreign laws 
can be adapted instead of adhering to a specific legal tradition.39 
To illustrate the point that the lines between legal traditions have 
blurred considerably, recall the example of the protection and enforcement 
of intellectual property. In earlier times, the laws governing intellectual 
property were significantly territorial in nature.40 The purpose of these 
laws centered on domestic internal policy, which generally sought to 
incentivize invention and artistic creation for the betterment and 
enhancement of the nation-state and its citizens.41 With the goal of 
 
 
rule-making authority and therefore subject to the same checks and balances. For example, under the 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, agencies must submit to a notice and comment requirement 
before developing a legislative rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2000). See also Thomas W. Merrill & 
Kathryn T. Watts, Agency Rules With the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 
467 (2002) (discussing the checks and balances that exist within the agency rule-making authority). 
 38. See, e.g., William M. Reisinger, Legal Orientations and the Rule of Law in Post-Soviet 
Russia, in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 172, 177 (Sally J. Kenny et 
al. eds., 1999) (identifying common law characteristics that have begun to emerge in the Russian civil 
law rooted system). 
 39. See Martin Shapiro, The Globalization of Law, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 37, 49 (1993) 
[hereinafter The Globalization of Law] (“[W]hat is sought globally is increased transparency of, and 
increased public participation in, bureaucratic decision-making.”). Cf. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, 
UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION: THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING 
GLOBALIZATION 10 (2000) (describing the change in economic perspective brought by globalization). 
“[L]et’s first study the global framework within which we operate and then decide what to produce.” 
Id. 
 40. JAY DRATLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL 
PROPERTY, § 1.09 (Law Journal Press 2003). Although lawyers and diplomats have devoted a 
tremendous amount of time and energy to developing international norms of intellectual property 
protection, intellectual property law is still largely national law. Id. The general principle of 
territoriality still governs, and it usually insures that each nation’s intellectual property laws have 
effect only with that nation’s borders. Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881) (finding that a process for “the 
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improving a nation-state through incentivized invention, a nation-state 
relying on the civil law tradition could well establish myriad statutory 
provisions to define and clarify complex issues such as who is an owner of 
intellectual property, who is a creator or developer of an invention or work 
of art, what rights do owners and creators possess by virtue of their 
invention or work of art, and to whom do obligations flow after an owner 
or creator has produced an invention or work of art. In addition, a nation-
state could define what constitutes an infringement upon those rights and 
obligations and under what circumstances, and finally what remedies are 
available for an infringement and to whom do they flow. Such issues could 
presumably be resolved with definitive answers from domestic statutes 
within the territorial framework of intellectual property protection and 
enforcement, such that the ideology of the civil law tradition is workable 
and effective. 
Now consider the evolution of intellectual property protection and 
enforcement; specifically the interaction between nation-states and the 
clash of legal traditions in an environment, which necessitates the 
promotion of trade and international economies while stimulating national 
growth and invention through protection and certainty. In the modern era 
of globalization, laws once domestic in nature have become almost 
completely extra-territorial.42 Several reasons exist for this phenomenon. 
First, travel and movement of individuals and products have reached new 
heights in efficiency. Second, modes of communication are now highly 
sophisticated. Third, technology has shifted the paradigm of trade from 
one nation-state with another to nation-state with nation-state, 
multinational corporations, small business enterprises, and individuals.43 
 
 
manufacturing of fat acids and glycerine from fatty bodies by the action of water at a high temperature 
and pressure” is patentable subject matter). In Tilghman, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to find 
anticipation from other, similar, processes previously employed in England and France. Id. at 711-12. 
Additionally, the Court upheld the antedating of the U.S. patent to that of the English patent because 
U.S. law provided 
that no person shall be debarred from receiving a patent for any invention or discovery . . . by 
reason of the same having been patented in a foreign country more than six months prior to his 
application: Provided, That the same shall not have been introduced into public and common use 
in the United States prior to the application for such patent: And provided also, That in all cases 
every such patent shall be limited to the term of fourteen years from the date or publication of such 
foreign letters-patent. (emphasis in original). 
Id. at 734 (quoting the 1839 law entitled, An Act in Addition to an Act to Promote the Progress of the 
Useful Arts). 
 42. See The Globalization of Law, supra note 39, at 38-39 (describing the globalization of 
contract and commercial law). 
 43. See Sarkar, supra note 10, at 706-07.  
Global market integration is a reality, best exemplified by the Internet. An unknown concept a 
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Both paradigm shifting technology and relationships have created complex 
environments for trade, finance, social policy, and culture in just the areas 
of intellectual property. Nation-states not only incentivize invention to 
spur more development, but now these nation-states must consider other 
policies, such as attracting international capital investment, growing 
domestic corporate enterprises to satisfy domestic markets as well as 
exporting trade and services in international markets, and providing an 
infrastructure conducive for next generation technology, business, politics, 
and living.44 What is clear from this focused study of evolution and 
globalization is that one legal tradition alone will not respond to the 
kaleidoscopic relationships, technological advancement, clashing cultures, 
and social policies, particularly those inherent in intellectual property. The 
complexity of today’s globalization necessitates relying on more than one 
legal tradition to meet the challenges and demands of global technologies 
responsible for the integration of markets, economies, societies, and 
cultures.  
III. GLOBALIZATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 
The current era of globalization is likely to continue. Thus, 
globalization, or, more aptly, Americanization, for better or for worse, is 
moving forward at warp speed.45 The question then is reduced to whether 
nation-states will choose to keep pace with this era of globalization, wait 
for another era, or ignore this era of globalization entirely. Before 
answering these questions, it is important to define just what is 
globalization. There are many definitions because there are many tiers and 
levels to define this phenomenon.46 For example, George Soros defines 
 
 
decade ago, the Internet is now an indispensable tool used by millions of people across the globe, 
many of whom live in the developing world. These relatively new cross-border exchanges are 
intensely liberating and have resulted in an explosion of information about emerging market 
economies. As a result, private actors in the industrialized world have expanded their 
entrepreneurial interests and forged new connections with the developing world. Thus, private 
entrepreneurs and investors have entered the development scene on an unprecedented scale. The 
movement toward more liberalized capital and technology flows is dramatic. 
Id. 
 44. See id. (highlighting challenges faced by emerging capital economies). 
 45. See The Globalization of Law, supra note 39, at 39. Professor Shapiro correctly observes 
that, “[g]iven the place of the United States in the world economy, this globalization of law through 
private corporate lawmaking rather naturally takes the form of the global Americanization of 
commercial law.” Id. He remarks that “[o]ften when we speak of globalization we mean that certain 
American legal practices are being diffused throughout the world . . . .” Id. 
 46. See Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency, and the Limits of Law: 
Administrative Law Reform and the Rule of Law in The People’s Republic of China, 19 BERKELEY J. 
INT’L L. 161, 162 (2001).  
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globalization as “the free movement of capital and the increasing 
domination of national economies by global financial markets and 
multinational corporations.”47 Even more broadly, Thomas L. Friedman 
defines globalization as:  
the inexorable integration of markets, nation-states and technologies 
to a degree never witnessed before—in a way that . . . enabl[es] 
individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the 
world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before, and in a 
way that . . . enabl[es] the world to reach into individuals, 
corporations and nation-states farther, faster, deeper, cheaper than 
ever before.48 
Globalization of law, however, is much more difficult to assess than 
globalization of markets, organizations, or culture. It is significant to 
weigh whether all of the world’s peoples and populations envision 
themselves living under one single set of legal rules, or whether they 
envision themselves as part of a movement toward uniformity in only a 
certain sector, namely the commercial sector, of a globalizing world.49 
Professor Shapiro makes the salient point that globalization of law, a 
distinct segment of globalization generally, must be considered “in 
reference to a number of interrelated phenomena.”50 He observes that the 
world’s populations have signed on to globalization of law as related to 
the commercial sector, particularly in response to “the globalization of 
markets and the organization and business practices of the multi-national 
corporations that operate in those markets.”51 In these situations, the 
 
 
Globalization can be measured in many ways. Indeed, whether one finds convergence, and hence 
signs of globalization, or divergence, depends to a large extent on the particular indicators that one 
chooses, the time frame and the degree of abstraction or focus. Markets, democracy, human rights 
and rule of law are broad standards, and each is capable of significant variation in theory and 
practice. 
Id. 
 47. GEORGE SOROS, GEORGE SOROS ON GLOBALIZATION, vii (2002). 
 48. FRIEDMAN, supra note 39, at 9. 
 49. See generally The Globalization of Law, supra note 39, at 161-64 (discussing the 
international proliferation of American business law and general trends in the globalization of certain 
legal vectors). See also Lawrence M. Friedman, Erewhon: The Coming of Global Legal Order, 37 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 347, 355 (2001). 
In today’s world, people in, say, Estonia, are just as eager to dress internationally and eat 
international food as their government is to join NATO, the European Union, and other 
international organizations. But there is a certain tension between this desire to globalize, and the 
desire to preserve local culture. 
 50. The Globalization of Law, supra note 39, at 38. 
 51. Id. 
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globalization of law is an extremely narrow and limited legal 
phenomenon, which has yet to be capable of measuring the exact quantum 
of human relationships that it governs.52 
A. Avoiding the Transplantation Effect 
The selection of a legal tradition based upon the desired ideology of a 
nation-state is becoming less important in this era of globalization.53 If 
globalization is a goal, then adopting law that has a level of familiarity for 
the transplanting state, and, more critically, is adopted within the context 
of domestic goals and principles is more important to a nation-state.54 
Contextual transplantation then is nothing more than legal realism within a 
nation-state. Legal realism refers to a philosophy of law or jurisprudence 
that proposes that most cases before courts present difficult questions that 
the judiciary must respond to and answer by balancing the interests of the 
parties and ultimately drawing a line between those parties in dispute.55 
This figurative line drawn by the judiciary is often done on the basis of its 
political, economic, and psychological inclinations.56 Appropriately, 
transplantation of legal tradition and law systems from other nation-states 
that occurs, absent consideration of principles of legal realism within the 
 
 
 52. See Friedman, supra note 49, at 358. 
It is, of course, an empirical question how far this convergence goes. It is widely believed that 
there remains an “American” way of drafting contracts—with every possible contingency spelled 
out—and a “Japanese” way which simply sets out the general framework and leaves the rest, 
through a handshake or nod of the head, more or less to the good faith of the parties. Oddly 
though, it is the “Japanese” way which, on the surface at least, seems to presume more 
convergence. After all, the parties to a deal must share some kind of normative presupposition to 
make the handshake effective. The deal has to rest on an understanding, on a framework of 
custom. Between two Japanese business people, the handshake may mean one thing; in the 
international sphere it would be another matter entirely. 
Id. (citiations omitted). 
 53. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 2 (“[T]he ‘transplantation effect’ is a more important predictor 
of legality than the supply of a particular legal family. . . . Moreover, the overall impact of the 
transplanting process is stronger than the impact of [sic.] transplanting a particular legal family.”). 
 54. See William E. Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and Consumer Protection 
Reforms in Transitional Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and Zimbabwe, 44 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1197, 1202-03 (1995) [hereinafter Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms] 
(“[L]aw reform initiatives take place in a distinctive national context, featuring a mix of commercial, 
government, social, and political institutions and circumstances with important implications for the 
substance and process of law reform.”). 
 55. See Michael P. Ambrosio, Legal Realism, 205 N.J. LAW. 30 (2000) (discussing legal realism 
and its role in American jurisprudence).  
 56. See id. at 35 (“Realism . . . emphasizes the power of judges . . . to exercise discretion in the 
application of legal rules. . . . Thus, it is inevitable that the choice of law and the interpretation of facts 
will reflect the value preferences of judges and juries to form the unarticulated basis for legal 
decisions.”). 
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adopting nation-state, may cause confusion, backlash, or rejection within 
the adopting nation-state.57 Such results are often referred to as the 
transplantation effect.58 
Avoiding the transplantation effect in this era of globalization requires 
legal reformers to develop a climate of acceptance of new law systems 
through respect for the judiciary, preservation of the rule of law, and 
informed study of the law and the reasons supporting the law.59 It is very 
likely that one law adopted in a foreign country for one purpose may have 
little to no effect in an adopting country, because each country may have a 
different climate for what may on the surface appear to be the same 
issue.60 Legal reformers should also be keen about the goals of a 
government premised upon the rule of law and the method and manner of 
 
 
 57. See Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 7-8 (identifying adaptation of a transplanted legal order to 
the preexisting legal order and familiarity with the legal system from which a nation-state is borrowing 
as indicators of receptiveness); Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms, supra note 52, at 1224 
(“The tasks of law design and implementation . . . requires a sustained in-country presence by 
technical advisors, close collaboration with indigenous experts, and a willingness to provide assistance 
through the critical period in which the host country’s institutions are applying the new law.”). 
 58. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 3. 
Virtually all countries today have a set of rules embodied in codes or court cases that were 
established by designated state organs, and state institutions in charge of enforcing these rules. We 
call this set of rules the formal legal order. Although it is quite important in many countries today, 
the formal legal order is but one element of the governance structure of society. All societies, 
including the most developed ones, are also governed by informal norms and institutions. This 
informal legal order evolves over time mostly by internalizing existing norms of a social group 
. . . . 
 [C]ountries that have developed formal legal orders internally, adapted the transplanted law to 
local conditions, and/or had a population that was already familiar with basic legal principles of 
the transplanted law should be able to further develop the formal legal codes and build effective 
legal systems. By contrast, countries that received foreign legal systems without similar pre-
dispositions are much more constrained in their ability to develop the formal legal order and will 
have greater difficulties in developing effective legal systems (the transplant effect). 
Id. 
 59. Mongolia, for example, has two high courts, the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. 
See MONG. CONST. ch. III, pt. IV, art. 50-51 and MONG. CONST. ch. V, for the constitutional 
provisions governing the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court of Mongolia. The latter, not 
directly part of the structure of the Judiciary, serves a supervisory role to “guarantee . . . the strict 
observance of the Constitution.” MONG. CONST. ch. V, art. 64, § 1. See also Anita Davis, Bridging Old 
and New Democracies: Texas Wesleyan University School of Law Hosts Mongolian Judges, 64 TEX. 
BAR J. 482, 483 (2001). The Constitutional Court is the only body with jurisdiction to hear 
constitutional disputes. See id. The judges of the remaining courts usually do not apply the constitution 
in everyday practice. Id. Because Mongolia’s stability is key to a stable northeast Asia, the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) has promised a grant of $10 million toward the 
reform of Mongolia’s judicial institutions in order to increase judicial responsibility and independence. 
Id. While altruism should always be the goal, the purpose of the investment is to assuage Western 
investors who want to guarantee “fairness and accessibility of the courts of any country” in which they 
do business. See id. 
 60. Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 6. 
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their implementation.61 The Western rule of law is based upon political 
and civil liberties and market mechanisms, which promote participatory, 
egalitarian, and inclusive values of democracy.62 The Western rule of law 
also respects and promotes the separation of powers. It recognizes the 
equality of the people with the state as well as the equality of state actors 
amongst themselves.63 Thus, for example, if the legislative or executive 
branches of government have taken considerable time and effort to 
develop empirical support for a law that it has created or adopted from 
another nation-state, then the judiciary should take great steps to respect 
the implementation of the law. Equally important, the judiciary must 
evaluate the success of a law and determine whether that law achieves its 
desired purpose. A law that does not accomplish its purpose has no value 
as a rule. Thus, these branches of government, with equality of lawmaking 
power, have the ability to adapt the Western rule of law to fit into the 
context of a particular nation-state. Nation-states must be aware that in 
very few circumstances will wholesale adoption of foreign law systems 
yield meaningful results for the transplanting nation.64 Accordingly, legal 
reformers must create a “buy-in” climate that citizens and government are 
invested in and depend upon to meet independent and national desires.65 
 
 
 61.  See Sarkar, supra note 10, at 723-24 (warning of the trade-offs of wholesale adoption of a 
foreign legal order without first considering the climate of the developing or transitioning country). 
 62. See id. at 724 (discussing the ideals of democracy and the role of democratization in 
transitioning countries). 
 63. See The Globalization of Law, supra note 39, at 48-49 (discussing judicial review and 
constitutional guarantees of individual rights as governmental limitations). 
 64. See Chibundu, supra note 5, at 115. Professor Chibundu concludes, 
 [T]he “two spaces of globalization” are as present in the area of the “rule of law” as elsewhere. 
There are those spheres of technocratic elitism into which a small proportion of the Third World 
may have bought, but there are other spaces of globalization—the spaces not simply of “civil 
society,” but of weakened States . . . . The near-instantaneous communication across the globe 
provided by current and emerging technologies makes it easy to believe that we are all going 
through the same experiences. In this atmosphere, it is tempting to see law, particularly the rule of 
law, as simply another commodity easily manufactured according to well-delineated 
specifications and readily sold across borders and cultures. When we do so, the specifications we 
have in mind are, of course, those with which we are familiar; those that have proved successful in 
our dominant societies are those of the West . . . . Even if one assumes shared experiences, the 
response to those experiences is unlikely to be identical. To the extent that the rule of law calls for 
rationally articulable responses to experience, we may expect the development of certain patterns 
of behavior; but it is unlikely that those patterns will be identical in their content. 
Id. See also supra notes 55-61 and accompanying text. 
 65. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 85 (stating that “constituency-building elements feature 
prominently in most rule-of-law activities.”); Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms, supra 
note 56, at 1213 (“Citizens in many formerly communist or socialist countries are accustomed to 
nonenforcement, or highly selective application, of laws and regulations. The lack of commitment and 
institutions to enforce nominal requirements engenders cynicism about the rule of law and the 
usefulness of enacting new legal commands.”). 
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Equally imperative in this era of globalization is gauging the desires of 
public and private parties before the adoption of a law or law system, 
because often public and private party interests conflict.66 To illustrate this 
potential conflict, one need only look to the Constitution of Mongolia. 
Article 7 provides for the protection of traditional resource rights of the 
indigenous people of Mongolia, stating that the “Historical, cultural, 
scientific, and intellectual heritages of the Mongolian people shall be 
under state protection.”67 This provision exists under the Sovereignty 
chapter of the constitution. But, in the Human Rights and Freedoms 
chapter of the constitution, Article 16, subsection 8 guarantees citizens the 
privilege to enjoy, as a right, the opportunity to create intellectual property 
that will be protected by law: “The citizens of Mongolia shall be 
guaranteed the privilege to enjoy . . . the right to engage in creative work 
in cultural, artistic and scientific fields and to benefit thereof. Copyrights 
and patents shall be protected by law.”68 The State seeks to protect the 
traditional resource rights of Indigenous Peoples from potential 
exploitation, while, citizens and domestic companies may wish to profit or 
benefit from the sale of potentially the same intellectual resource. The 
former and its constituency represent the public party interest, while the 
latter represents the private party interest. In seeking to become involved 
in the global marketplace, a nation-state must address and define its 
political, economic, and social agenda before settling on rules of law from 
other nation-states that may not be consistent with the adopting state’s 
policies.69 In the above example, if a potential conflict does exist between 
 
 
 66. See Sarkar, supra note 10, at 721-24. The range of competing public and private interests to 
be weighed and considered during the formulation and implementation of a legal system is both broad 
and interrelated. If participation in the globalized marketplace is a goal, reformers should consider the 
expectations of a foreign investor when developing a rule of law regime, it is more important, in the 
long and short term, to refrain from sacrificing national interests, concerns, and traditions for those of a 
globalized marketplace. Id. To make such a sacrifice often results in confusion, uncertainty, and 
conflicting laws; defeating the purpose of law reform aimed at attracting capital. Id. See also 
Berkowitz, supra note 18, at 16 (“[A] legal reform strategy should aim at improving legality by 
carefully choosing legal rules whose meaning can be understood and whose purpose is appreciated by 
domestic law makers, law enforcers, and economic agents . . . .”). 
 67. MONG. CONST. ch. I, art. 7, § 1. 
 68. MONG. CONST. ch. II, art. 16, § 8. 
 69. The area of intellectual property offers further illustration in a broader scope. In order to 
secure trade advantages, developed nation-states advocated for and won international protection of 
intellectual property through the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS). While 
“internationalis[ing] standards of protection under intellectual property law, thereby eliminating trade 
distortions and impediments to international trade that arise from incompatible legal systems,” TRIPS 
protects the intellectual property of developed nations and simultaneously disadvantages developing 
and transitioning nations. TONY SIMPSON, INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND SELF-DETERMINATION 116 
(1997). The disadvantage is rooted in the inability to access new technologies, which negatively 
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public and private parties respecting the commodification of traditional 
resource rights, a domestic policy compromise between these two 
positions should occur. 
B. Achieving the Rule of Law 
The conflict and compromise scenario will pervade all domestic policy 
for all nation-states caught in the wave of globalization. Whether speaking 
about the impact of globalization on intellectual property rights or 
discussing tangible property rights or the homogenization of culture, 
globalization will seek to integrate and change ways of economic and 
social existence.70 Globalization will have an impact on the makeup of 
society, changing once agrarian lifestyles to urban, placing more emphasis 
on production and innovation, accelerating life and movement beyond the 
tolerance of many members of society.71 Such societal changes impact the 
distribution of law and justice, particularly when globalization is 
accompanied by free, open markets.72 Economies will receive capital 
infusion as a reward for innovation, people will be drawn to centers of 
commerce to become involved in innovation, and law and law systems 
will necessarily grow around these environments.73 The task is to balance 
 
 
impacts economic development, and impinges on a nation’s “sovereign right . . . to exploit their 
resources in accordance with nationally-determined development policies and priorities.” Id. at 116. 
 70. See Friedman, supra note 49, at 351. 
Certainly, the mass media have powerfully affected world culture. They have influenced the 
patterns of wants and desires, the patterns of consumption and hoped-for consumption, and the 
demands for goods and services. Hence, global culture is the messenger that prepares the way for 
international trade. 
 But who consumes this global culture? . . . Science and technology have revolutionized 
production, created the industrial world, and as a result, have produced enormous world wealth. 
The wealth is very badly distributed within many countries, to be sure, and even more so between 
countries. Most people in the world are still immured in poverty and misery, without access to the 
Internet, to jet travel, or even to television. 
Id.; see, e.g., Daniel Salau, Globalisation Entrenches Itself on the Maasai, CIVICUS, Sept. 2002, at 
http://globalpolicy.org/globalizing/cultural/2002/0920massai.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2003). 
 71. See Friedman, supra note 49, at 348-49 (stating that globalization has globalized two things: 
trade and people). Ultimately, the phenomena of the proliferation of the Western media, “huge multi-
national corporations, companies that are everywhere and nowhere,” and “[o]rdinary people, business 
people, jet-setters, tourists, refugees, in-migrants, and out-migrants move[ing] rapidly in and out of 
their countries and across the world,” means that “the Japan of today [is] more like the France of 
today, than it is like the old, feudal Japan of Lady Murasaki or the Kyoto court.” Id. at 348-49, 353. 
 72. See generally Chantal Thomas, Globalization and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 33 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV 1451 (2000); Gracia Clark, The Roots of Cultural Backlash in Contemporary Processes 
of Globalization, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 257 (1999).  
 73. See, e.g., Jeremy Rifkin, Is Ownership an Outmoded Concept?, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, 
http://www.commondreams.org/views/041000-103.htm (last visited Aug, 29, 2003) (describing the 
restructuring of the concept of property and ownership).  
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such growth by injecting legal realism to support both international and 
domestic initiatives that in turn reduce the level of homogenization 
attendant with globalization.74 The rule of law can accomplish this 
balancing act by promoting strong internal legal systems directed at 
national interests. The Mongolian Constitution provides for this in Article 
1, Section 2,: “The supreme principles of the activities of the State shall be 
ensurance of democracy, justice, freedom, equality and national unity and 
respect of law.”75 
Essential to achieving respect for the law, as well as to strengthening 
legal institutions and creating a climate favorable to economic 
development, is the promotion of the constitutional function of each 
governmental entity. Legal stability fosters both social and economic 
development through certainty, ultimately providing a balance between 
national interests and economic growth. Another hallmark of the overlap 
between the globalization of law and Americanization is the worldwide 
proliferation of “written constitutions dividing government powers and 
guaranteeing individual rights, [and] the spread of constitutional courts 
and constitutional judicial review.”76 Professor Shapiro notes that 
 
 
 74. See Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms, supra note 56, at 1216. Professor 
Kovacic opines: “To the greatest extent possible, the law’s substantive commands and implementation 
mechanism should build upon existing legal commands and institutions.” Id. See also, Sarkar, supra 
note 10, at 723. Although Rumu Sarkar agrees that a rule of law regime is necessary if a developing 
country intends to attract Western foreign investment, Sarkar warns that adoption of Western legal 
thought may have extremely high costs, “especially when indigenous or traditional forms of legal 
thought and governance are sacrificed in the process.” Id. Sarkar further states: “A developing 
country’s own legal conceptual framework, legal history, and institutions may lose [its] authenticity in 
this process, and that loss could be permanent.” Id. 
 75. MONG. CONST. ch. I, art. 1, § 2. 
 76. The Globalization of Law, supra note 39, at 48. The trend toward constitutionalism and 
judicial review may appear antithetical to the theory underlying the civil law tradition. While the civil 
law states of the European continent, did not adopt a system of judicial review until after World War 
II, France, Germany, and Italy now have flourishing systems. Id. Further, Eastern European states as 
well as Asian post-Leninist states “have adopted constitutional judicial review almost automatically.” 
Id. The recognition of judicial review as an important limitation on governmental powers manifests 
differently along the lines of common law and civil law traditions. Unlike the U.S. model, where every 
court can rule on the constitutionality of a law, civil law states have created a separate constitutional 
court. The World Bank Group, Constitutional Review and Government Accountability, at 
http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/legal/review.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2003). The primary 
rationale for creating a separate court harkens back to the role of judges in the civil law tradition. 
Constitutional review often requires “judges to decide value-laden, quasi-political matters” and thus 
requires much greater discretion; career civil law judges, it was believed, “were unlikely to have the 
policy and political skills needed.” Id. Additional nuances to the systems of judicial review are 
practiced by nation-states. Some constitutional courts act as an overseer and conduct abstract review of 
laws while others are empowered to decide the issue only if it is presented in a controversy between 
two litigants. Id. See Shapiro, supra note 27 for a discussion of the various hypothesis behind the 
phenomenon of judicial review. 
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“[w]henever a constitution divides powers, it almost always necessitates a 
constitutional court to police the boundaries.”77 Emerging as an important 
ingredient toward the security of a transition government is, thus, an 
independent judiciary, which serves to temper legislative and executive 
discretion.78 The Constitution of Mongolia, in fact, provides for a 
Constitutional Court, mandated to “guarantee . . . the strict observance of 
the Constitution.”79 
However, providing for judicial review by an independent 
constitutional court and achieving actualization are discrete matters.80 For 
example, the Parliament, the State Great Hural, and the Constitutional 
Court of Mongolia appear to be at an impasse, severely threatening the 
legitimacy of the court. Following an initial period in which “Mongolia’s 
democratic system seemed to be deepening,”81 the Court was faced with 
the question of whether the Constitution established “a presidential system 
where the cabinet is unrelated to the parliament” or whether the system 
created was “a parliamentary system, wherein the government is formed 
by the leading parties in parliament.”82 The provision of the Constitution 
 
 
 77. The Globalization of Law, supra note 39, at 49. See also Shapiro, supra note 27, at 196-99. 
 78. See Christopher M. Larkins, Judicial Independence and Democratization: A Theoretical and 
Conceptual Analysis, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 605, 606 (1996) (“Ideally, through the application of judicial 
or constitutional review, judges cannot only mediate conflicts between political actors but also prevent 
the arbitrary exercise of government power. In fulfilling this role, the courts become powerful actors in 
maintaining the submission of the state to law.”).  
 79. MONG. CONST. ch. V, art. 64, § 1. 
 80. Several factors have been identified as integral to the definition of judicial independence. The 
first is impartiality, “or the idea that judges will base their decisions on the law and the facts, not any 
predilection toward one of the litigants.” Larkins, supra note 80, at 609. Another has been termed 
“‘political insularity,’ or the notion that judges should not be used as tools to further political aims nor 
punished for preventing their realization.” Id. The government is often viewed as posing “the most 
serious threat to judicial independence for two reasons: it has a potential interest in the outcome of 
myriad cases, and it has so much potential power over judges.” Matthew Stephenson, Judicial 
Independence: What it is, How it Can be Measured, Why it Occurs, at http://www1.worldbank.org/ 
publicsector/legal/judicialindependence.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2003). The final characteristic of an 
independent judiciary is that, once rendered, judicial decisions are respected, especially in relation to 
“the scope of the judiciary’s authority as an institution or, in other words, the relationship of the courts 
to other parts of the political system and society, and the extent to which they are collectively seen as a 
legitimate body for the determination of right, wrong, legal, and illegal.” Larkin, supra note 78, at 610. 
 81. Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 311. After the promulgation of the 1992 Constitution, ushering in 
a new era of democracy, the Constitutional Court of Mongolia successfully exercised its jurisdiction 
by occasionally reviewing legislation, sometimes striking it as unconstitutional, and resolving a 
number of politically charged disputes in a “manner that led to the increased legitimacy of the Court.” 
Id. 
 82. Id. at 312. The controversy arose when, following the 1996 parliamentary elections, the 
Court was petitioned to “prevent the [parliamentary majority] from filling the cabinet with members of 
the State Great Hural relying on a provision in the Constitution that ‘members of parliament shall have 
no other employment.’” Id. at 311. In this initial round, the Court found that members of parliament 
could not hold cabinet positions, erupting “several tensions in the political system that were either 
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of Mongolia in question provides, “Members of the State Great Hural . . . 
shall not hold concurrently any posts and employment other than those 
assigned by law.”83 The events that followed resemble a political tug-of-
war. In response to the Court’s decision that there was a separation 
between the Parliament and the Cabinet, the Parliament passed a 
constitutional amendment, which the Court also found “incompatible with 
the Constitution, particularly the separation of powers principle.”84 After 
further jockeying, the Parliament initiated and passed another, identical, 
amendment.85 However, like the first, this amendment will ultimately 
come before the Court, again, begging the original question.86 
Legal and economic reform stir a variety of internal and external 
tensions. In strengthening legal institutions and the rule of law, reformers 
should be wary, not only of the external influences brought by 
globalization, but also those internal power struggles that may ultimately 
undermine the transition process. The Mongolian situation may be best 
considered through the doctrine of separation of powers. The mandate and 
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is set forth in the Constitution.87 
Functioning as a fourth arm of government, the Court “exercis[es] 
supreme supervision over the implementation of the Constitution, making 
judgment on the violation of its provisions and resolving constitutional 
disputes.”88 By repeatedly ignoring the findings of the Court relating to the 
separation of Parliament and the Cabinet, the Mongolian Parliament is 
effectively hindering the transition process and weakening the rule of 
law.89 Judicial empowerment does not have to mean judicial superiority. 
 
 
directly caused or exacerbated by the decision to separate the parliament from the government.” Id. at 
311, 314. When the Parliament passed legislation in 1998 “to allow Members of Parliament to serve in 
the Cabinet,” and when challenged, the Court followed its original decision and rendered the law 
unconstitutional, “the result was political chaos.” Id. at 314.  
 83. MONG. CONST. ch. III, art. 29, § 1. 
 84. Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 317. 
 85. Id. at 321. 
 86. Id. 
 87. The Constitutional Court is not directly a part of the judiciary. Compare MONG. CONST. ch. 
V (establishing the Constitutional Court of Mongolia) with MONG. CONST. ch. III, art. 47-56 
(establishing the Judiciary of Mongolia). Interestingly, the Court is created under a separate chapter of 
the Constitution, whereas the other branches of government, the legislature, a divided executive, and 
the judiciary, are created in the same chapter of the Constitution. Compare MONG. CONST. ch. V 
(establishing the Constitutional Court of Mongolia) with MONG. CONST. ch. III (establishing the state 
structure of Mongolia). 
 88. MONG. CONST. ch. V, art. 64, § 1. 
 89. Following the Court’s initial decision that the first amendment passed by the Parliament was 
unconstitutional, the Parliament failed to follow its own procedural rules and neither accepted nor 
rejected the Court’s decision. Ginsburg, supra note 4, at 317. The Parliament subsequently debated the 
issue and voted that the Court had “heard an issue outside its jurisdiction—namely the constitutionality 
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Close study should reveal that a strong, apolitical judiciary helps to 
guarantee the elasticity of the constitutional principles that is the pillar of 
Mongolia’s new democracy. For these principles to apply, the rule of law 
should be practiced at all levels of the judiciary, thereby allowing for the 
flexibility and fairness of a democratic justice system to reverberate 
throughout the entire legal system. 
IV. FUTURE ISSUES 
Law is a tool, and lawyers and judges are social engineers. As such, 
law should assist a nation-state in achieving just goals for its citizenry. 
Mongolia should look at law reform, legal traditions, and law systems with 
an eye toward navigating through this era of globalization by defining its 
will, its desires, and its goals. Post-World War II saw one era of 
globalization, and the technology revolution has borne yet another. More 
opportunities will undoubtedly emerge to become even more connected to 
the global marketplace. The keys to law reform and law system adoption 
are to know the limits for receiving laws from other nations, inject legal 
realism of the adopting State into the adopted law, and strengthen the rule 
of law within the State by promoting transparency of the law, thus 
building confidence in the system encouraging flexibility in the 
interpretation of law, and allowing for evolution of that law in changed 
circumstances, one of which will surely be yet another era of 
globalization. Mongolia should also study additional methods to promote 
domestic human rights laws, such as labor laws, environmental laws, 
education laws, and child protection laws.90 Adherence to these types of 
public laws should benefit any bargain that Mongolia strikes with Western 
globalists. 
If time permitted more research regarding the law of intellectual 
property protection and enforcement, the law and policy on traditional 
resource rights of the indigenous peoples of Mongolia, as compared to the 
 
 
of a constitutional amendment.” Id. at 318. In effect, the Parliament circumvented the Constitution and 
“authorized itself to interpret the Constitution,” a duty exclusively delegated to the Court. Id. 
 90. Another trend in the globalization of law has been the “worldwide increase of legal 
protection against the ill effects of technical, economic, and social devices too complex, distant, or 
powerful to make individual self-protection possible.” The Globalization of Law, supra note 39, at 50. 
On the surface, these types of laws serve the most important function of law; they address the 
protection and welfare of people. However, they have been labeled “protectionist” by economists. By 
enacting laws like environmental laws and consumer protection laws, a nation-state can create 
effective trade barriers. Id. at 51. Consequently, in the capitalist mind, two alternatives surface: 
recognition of each country’s standards, effectively creating a “race to the bottom” to attract more and 
more capital or a movement toward transnational standards of protection. See id. at 52-54. 
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private intellectual property rights of citizens engaged in the production of 
inventions and creative works, would be of great interest.91 A large facet 
of trade in the global community has been the exploitation and 
commodification of spirituality, culture, art, and medicines of the 
indigenous peoples, like the Aboriginal Peoples of Australia, the Maori 
Peoples of Aotearoa, and the Native Hawaiians, Alaska Natives, and 
Native Americans of the United States.92 In the case of each of these 
peoples, law worked as a colonizing force, and traditional resource rights 
became a commodity for the colonizers’ trade and desecration.93 
Globalization may have a similar impact on the Indigenous Peoples of 
Mongolia, but time and attention to this area of inquiry may avoid future 
conflict and even inspire compromise. 
Another area of inquiry is the State perspective on the development and 
creation of intellectual property at the government’s expense or with 
government resources, but where the innovation results from individual 
endeavor or the time and effort of a party in contract with the State. This 
area is especially controversial in this era of globalization because 
technology provides individuals with the power to bargain with 
individuals or corporations in foreign countries or even with foreign 
governments for intellectual properties that are, by their very nature, 
movable and easily transportable. Such areas of inquiry require study and 
refining so that Mongolia, like other nation-states, can promote national 
unity through innovation while still providing citizens with the incentive 
to produce and create for their individual benefit. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Globalization is about pure competition. Law is the tool that protects 
people from the harms attendant with competition. Free and open markets 
are the highlight of today’s globalization. Understanding and defining the 
 
 
 91. The cultural and intellectual property rights of the world’s indigenous peoples are areas 
gaining critical attention in national and international forums. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH 
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, LEAFLET NO. 12: WIPO AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html /racism/indileaflet12.doc (last visited Aug. 29, 2003) for a synopsis of the 
cultural and intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples as well as initiatives and activities 
related to its protection. See also Wilton Littlechild, Report of the First Session of the Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues, E/2002/42 ¶¶ 61-62, 81-82 (2002); Mataatua Declaration on Cultural 
and Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples: First International Conference on the Cultural 
& Intellectual Property Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Whakatane, Aotearoa, New Zealand (1993), at 
http://www.ipcb.org/resolutionshtmls/mataatua.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2003). 
 92. See generally Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on Indigenous Culture: 
An Intellectual Property Perspective, 23 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 229 (1998). 
 93. Id. 
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course that a nation-state should take in this era of globalization is the 
cornerstone for recognizing how much globalization a nation can 
withstand. This era of globalization means Americanization and that 
leading the global community in globalization creates a commensurate 
responsibility to temper the hegemonic impact that globalization will have 
on developing nations, their markets, and their cultures. If globalization is 
to be optimal, nation-states should insist on law reform and 
implementation that will protect their borders. To work optimally for all, 
globalization must be accompanied by a strong and respected rule of law. 
The rule of law is a principle to be followed for both adopting nation-
states and particularly for the leaders of globalization, which in this era is 
the United States. Without the rule of law, regardless of the legal tradition 
that a nation-state follows, chaos will result, and chaos does not make for 
efficient markets, much less civilized societies. 
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APPENDIX 
THE CONSTITUTION OF MONGOLIA94  
We, the people of Mongolia:  
• Strengthening the independence and sovereignty of the state,  
• Cherishing human rights and freedoms, justice and national unity,  
• Inheriting the traditions of national statehood, history and culture, 
• Respecting the accomplishments of human civilization,  
• And aspiring toward the supreme objective of building a human, 
civil and democratic society in the country  
Hereby proclaim the Constitution of Mongolia.  
CHAPTER ONE 
Sovereignty of Mongolia  
Article 1 
 1.Mongolia is independent, sovereign republic.  
2.The supreme principles of the activities of the State shall be 
ensurance of democracy, justice, freedom, equality and 
national unity and respect of law.  
Article 2  
1.By its state structure, Mongolia is a unitary State.  
2.The territory of Mongolia shall be divided into administrative 
units only.  
Article 3 
1.State power shall be vested in the people of Mongolia. The 
people shall exercise it through their direct participation in 
state affairs and through the representative bodies of State 
power elected by them.  
2.Illegal seizure of State power or attempt to do so shall be 
prohibited.  
Article 4  
1.The territorial integrity and frontiers of Mongolia shall be 
inviolable.  
2.The frontiers of Mongolia shall be safeguarded by law.  
3.Stationing of foreign troops in the territory of Mongolia, 
allowing them to cross the state borders for the purpose of 
passing through the country’s territory shall be prohibited 
unless an appropriate law is adopted.  
 
 
 94. Translated by Lama Bataa Mishigish. 
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Article 5 
1.Mongolia shall have an economy based on different forms of 
property and answering both universal trends of world 
economic development and national specifics.  
2.The state shall recognize all forms of both public and private 
property and shall protect the rights of the owner by law.  
3.The owner’s rights shall be restricted exclusively by due process 
of law.  
4.The State shall regulate the economy of the country with a view 
to ensure the nation’s economic security, the development of 
all modes of production and social development of the 
population.  
5.The livestock is national wealth and subject to state protection. 
Article 6  
1.The land, its subsoil, forests, water, fauna and flora and other 
natural resources shall be subject to national sovereignty and 
state protection.  
2.The land except that in citizen’s private ownership, as well as 
the subsoil with its mineral wealth, forest, water resources and 
game shall be the property of the State.  
3.The State may give for private ownership plots of land, except 
pastures and areas under public and special use, only to the 
citizens of Mongolia. This provision shall not apply to the 
ownership of the subsoil thereof.  
Citizens shall be prohibited to transfer the land in their 
possession to foreign nationals and stateless persons by way of 
selling, bartering, donating or pledging as well as transferring 
to others for exploitation without permission from competent 
state authorities.  
4.The State shall have the right to hold responsible the landowners 
in connection with the manner the land is used, to exchange or 
take it over with compensation on the grounds of special 
public need, or confiscate the land if it is used in a manner 
adverse to the health of the population, the interests of 
environmental protection and national security.  
5.The State may allow foreign nationals, legal persons and 
stateless persons to lease land for a specified period of time 
under conditions and procedures as provided for by law.  
Article 7  
1.Historical, cultural, scientific and intellectual heritages of the 
Mongolian people shall be under State protection.  
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2.Intellectual values produced by the citizens are the property of 
their authors and the national wealth of Mongolia.  
Article 8  
1.The Mongolian language is the official language of the State.  
2.Section 1 of this Article shall not affect the right of national 
minorities of other tongues to use their native languages in 
education and communication and in the pursuit of cultural, 
artistic and scientific activities.  
Article 9  
1.The State shall respect religions and religions shall honor the 
State.  
2.State institutions shall not engage in religious activities and the 
Church shall not pursue political activities.  
3.The relationship between the State and the Church shall be 
regulated by law. 
Article 10  
1.Mongolia shall adhere to the universally recognized norms and 
principles of international law and pursue a peaceful foreign 
policy.  
2.Mongolia shall fulfill in good faith its obligations under 
international treaties to which it is a Party.  
3.The international treaties to which Mongolia is a Party, shall 
become effective as domestic legislation upon the entry into 
force of the laws on their ratification or accession.  
4.Mongolia shall not abide by any international treaty or other 
instruments incompatible with its Constitution.  
Article 11  
1.The duty of the State is to secure the country’s independence, 
ensure national security and public order.  
2.Mongolia shall have armed forces for self-defense. The structure 
and organization of the armed forces and the rules of military 
service shall be determined by law.  
Article 12  
1.The symbols of the independence and sovereignty of Mongolia 
are the State Emblem, Banner, Flag, Seal and the Anthem.  
2.The State Emblem, Banner, Flag and the Anthem shall express 
the historical tradition, aspiration, unity, justice and the spirit 
of the people of Mongolia.  
3.The State Emblem shall be of circular shape with the white lotus 
serving as its base and the “never-ending Tumen Nasan” 
pattern forming its outer frame. The main background is of 
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blue color signifying the eternal blue sky, the Mongols 
traditional sanctity. 
In the center of the Emblem a combination of the Precious 
Steed and the Golden Soyombo sign is depicted as an 
expression of the independence, sovereignty and spirit of 
Mongolia.  
In the upper part of the Emblem, the Chandmani ( Wish-
granting Jewel) sign symbolizes the past, the present and the 
future.  
In the lower part of the Emblem, the sign of the Wheel 
entwined with the silk scarf Hadag in an expression of 
reverence and respect, symbolizes continued prosperity. It is 
placed against the background of a “hill” pattern conveying 
the notion of “mother earth.”  
4.The traditional Great White Banner of the unified Mongolian 
State is a state ceremonial attribute.  
5.The State Flag shall be a rectangle divided vertically into three 
equal parts colored red, blue, and red. The blue color of the 
center of the flag, symbolizes “the eternal blue sky” and the 
red color on both sides symbolizes progress and prosperity. 
The Golden Soyombo sign shall be depicted on the red stripe 
nearest to the flagpole. The ratio of the width and length of the 
Flag shall be 1:2.  
6.The State Seal having a lion-shaped handle, shall be of a square 
form with the State Emblem in the center and the words 
“Mongol Uls” (Mongolia) inscribed on both sides. The 
President shall be the holder of the State Seal.  
7.The procedure for the ceremonial use of the State symbols and 
the text and melody of the State Anthem shall be prescribed 
by the law.  
Article 13  
1.The capital of the State shall be the city where the State 
Supreme bodies permanently sit. The capital city of Mongolia 
is the city of Ulaanbaatar.  
2.The legal status of the capital city shall be defined by law.  
CHAPTER TWO 
Human Rights and Freedoms 
Article 14  
1.All persons lawfully residing within Mongolia are equal before 
the law and the court.  
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2.No person shall be discriminated on the basis of ethnic origin, 
language, race, age, sex, social origin and status, property, 
occupation and post, religion, opinion or education. Every one 
shall be a person before the law.  
Article 15  
1.The grounds and procedure for Mongolian nationality, 
acquisition or loss of citizenship shall be defined only by law.  
2.Deprivation of Mongolian citizenship, exile and extradition of 
citizens of Mongolia shall be prohibited.  
Article 16 
The citizens of Mongolia shall be guaranteed the privilege to enjoy the 
following rights and freedoms: 
1) the right to life. Deprivation of human life shall be 
strictly prohibited unless capital punishment constructed by 
Mongolian penal law for the most serious crimes, is imposed 
by a competent court as its final decision.  
2) the right to healthy and safe environment, and to be 
protected against environmental pollution and ecological 
imbalance.  
3) the right to fair acquisition, possession and inheritance 
of movable and immovable property. Illegal confiscation and 
requisitioning of the private property of citizens shall be 
prohibited. If the State and its bodies appropriate private 
property on the basis of exclusive public need, they shall do so 
with due compensation and payment.  
4) the right to free choice of employment, favorable 
conditions of work, remuneration, rest and private enterprise. 
No one shall be unlawfully forced to work.  
5) the right to material and financial assistance in old age, 
disability, childbirth and childcare and in other cases as 
provided by law.  
6) the right to the protection of health and medical care. 
The procedure and conditions of free medical aid shall be 
defined by law.  
7) the right to education. The State shall provide basic 
general education free of charge. Citizens may establish and 
operate private schools if these meet the requirements of the 
State.  
8) the right to engage in creative work in cultural, artistic 
and scientific fields and to benefit thereof. Copyrights and 
patents shall be protected by law.  
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9) the right to take part in the government of the country 
directly or through representative bodies. The right to elect 
and to be elected to State bodies. The right to elect shall be 
enjoyed from the age of eighteen years and the age eligible for 
being elected shall be defined by law according to the 
requirements in respect of the bodies or posts concerned.  
10) the right to freedom of association in political parties 
or other voluntary organizations on the basis of social and 
personal interests and opinion. Political parties and other mass 
organizations shall uphold public order and state security, and 
abide by law. Discrimination and persecution of a person or 
joining a political party or other associations or for being their 
member shall be prohibited. Party membership of some 
categories of state employees may be suspended.  
11) Men and women shall have equal right in political, 
economic, social, cultural fields and in marriage. Marriage 
shall be based on the equality and mutual consent of the 
spouses who have reached the age defined by law. The State 
shall protect the interests of the family, motherhood and the 
child.  
12) the right to submit a petition or a complaint to State 
bodies and officials. The State bodies and officials shall be 
obliged to respond to the petitions or complaints of citizens in 
conformity with law. 
13) the right to personal liberty and safety. No one shall be 
searched, arrested, detained, persecuted or restricted of liberty 
save in accordance with procedures and grounds determined 
by law. No one shall be subjected to torture, inhuman, cruel or 
degrading treatment. Where a person is arrested he/she, 
his/her family and counsel shall be notified within a period of 
time established by law of the reasons for and grounds of the 
arrest. Privacy of citizens, their families, correspondence and 
residence shall be protected by law.  
14) the right to appeal to the court to protect his/her right if 
he/she considers that the right of freedoms as spelt out by the 
Mongolian law or an international treaty have been violated; 
to be compensated for the damage illegally caused by other; 
not to testify against himself/herself, his/her family, or parents 
and children; to defense; to receive legal assistance; to have 
evidence examined; to a fair trial; to be tried in his/her 
presence; to appeal against a court judgment to seek pardon. 
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Compelling to testify against himself/herself shall be 
prohibited. Every person shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty by a court by due process of law. The penalties 
imposed on the convicted shall not be applicable to his/her 
family and relatives.  
15) Freedom of conscience and religion.  
16) Freedom of thought, opinion and expression, speech, 
press, peaceful assembly. Procedures for organizing 
demonstrations and other assemblies shall be determined by 
law.  
17) the right to seek and receive information except that 
which the State and its bodies are legally bound to protect as 
secret. In order to protect human rights, dignity and reputation 
of persons and to ensure national defense, security and public 
order, the information which is not subject to disclosure shall 
be classified and protected by law.  
18) the right to freedom of movement and residence within 
the country, to travel or reside abroad, to return to home 
country. The right to travel and reside abroad may be limited 
exclusively by law for the purpose of ensuring the security of 
the country and population and protecting public order.  
Article 17 
1.Citizens of Mongolia while upholding justice and humanism, 
shall fulfill in good faith the following basis duties:  
1) to respect and abide by the Constitution and other laws;  
2) to respect the dignity, reputation, right and legitimate 
interests of others; 
3) to pay taxes levied by law;  
4) to defend motherland and serve in the army according to 
law.  
2.It is a sacred duty for every citizen to work, protect his/her 
health, bring up and educate his/her children and to protect 
nature and the environment. 
Article 18 
1.The rights and duties of aliens residing in Mongolia shall be 
regulated by the Mongolian law and by the treaties concluded 
with the State of the person concerned.  
2.Mongolia shall adhere to the principle of reciprocity in 
determining the rights and duties of foreign nationals in an 
international treaty being concluded with the country 
concerned.  
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3.The rights and duties of stateless persons within the territory of 
Mongolia shall be determined by the Mongolian law.  
4.Aliens or stateless persons persecuted for their convictions, 
political or other activities pursuing justice, may be granted 
asylum in Mongolia on the basis of their well-founded 
requests.  
5.In allowing the foreign nationals and stateless persons under the 
jurisdiction of Mongolia to exercise the basic rights and 
freedoms provided for in Article 16 of the Constitution, the 
State of Mongolia may establish necessary restrictions upon 
the rights other than the inalienable rights spelt out in 
international instruments to which Mongolia is a Party, out of 
the consideration of ensuring the national security of the 
country and populations, and public order.  
Article 19 
1.The State shall be responsible to the citizens for the creation of 
economic, social, legal and other guarantees for ensuring 
human rights and freedoms, for the prevention of violation of 
human rights and freedoms and to restoration of infringed 
rights.  
2.In case of a state of emergency or martial law, the human rights 
and freedoms as defined by the Constitution and other laws 
shall be subject to limitation only by a law. Such a law shall 
not affect the right to life, the freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion, as well as the right not to be subjected to torture, 
inhuman and cruel treatment.  
3.In exercising his/her rights and freedoms one shall not infringe 
on the national security, rights and freedoms of others and 
violate public order.  
CHAPTER THREE 
The State Structure of Mongolia  
I. The State Great Hural of Mongolia 
Article 20  
The State Great Hural of Mongolia is the highest organ of State power 
and the supreme legislative power shall be vested only in the State Great 
Hural.  
Article 21  
1.The State Great Hural shall have one chamber and consist of 76 
members.  
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2.The members of the State Great Hural shall be elected by 
citizens of Mongolia entitled to vote, on the basis of universal, 
free, direct suffrage by secret ballot for a term of four years.  
3.Citizens of Mongolia who have reached the age of 25 years and 
are eligible for elections shall be elected to the State Great 
Hural. 
4.The procedure of the election of members of the State Great 
Hural shall be defined by law.  
Article 22  
1.If extraordinary circumstances arising from sudden calamities 
occurring in the whole or a part of the country, imposition of 
martial law or outbreak of public disorder prevent regular 
general elections from being held, the State Great Hural shall 
retain its mandate till extraordinary circumstances cease to 
exist and the newly elected members of the State Great Hural 
are sworn in.  
2.The State Great Hural may decide on its dissolution if not less 
than two thirds of its members consider that the State Great 
Hural is unable to carry out its mandate, or if the President in 
consolidation with the Chairman of the State Great Hural, 
proposes to do so for the same reason. In case of such a 
decision, the State Great Hural shall exercise its powers till the 
newly elected members of the State Great Hural are sworn in.  
Article 23  
1.A member of the State Great Hural shall be an envoy of the 
people and shall represent and uphold the interests of all the 
citizens and the State.  
2.The mandate of a member of the State Great Hural shall begin 
with an oath taken before the State Emblem and expire when 
newly elected members of the State Great Hural are sworn in.  
Article 24 
1.Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the State Great Hural shall be 
nominated and elected from among the members of the State 
Great Hural by secret ballot.  
2.The term of office of the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the 
State Great Hural shall be four years. They can be relieved of 
or removed from their posts before the expiry of their terms 
for reasons defined by law.  
Article 25  
1.The State Great Hural may consider at its initiative any issue 
pertaining to domestic and foreign policies of the country, and 
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shall keep within its exclusive competence the following 
questions and decide thereon:  
1) to enact laws, make amendments to them;  
2) to define the basis of the domestic and foreign policies 
of the State;  
3) to set and announce the date of elections of the President 
and the State Great Hural and its members;  
4) to determine and change the structure and composition 
of the Standing Committees of the State Great Hural, the 
Government and other bodies directly accountable to it 
according to law;  
5) to pass a law recognizing the full powers of the 
President after his/her election and to relieve or remove the 
President;  
6) to appoint, replace or remove the Prime Minister, 
members of the Government and other bodies responsible and 
accountable to the State Great Hural as provided for by law;  
7) to define the State’s financial, credit, tax and monetary 
policies; to lay down the guidelines for the country’s 
economic and social development; to approve the 
Government’s program of action, the State budget and the 
report on its execution;  
8) to supervise the implementation of laws and other 
decisions of the State Great Hural;  
9) to define the State borders;  
10) to determine the structure, composition and powers of 
the National Security Council of Mongolia;  
11) to approve and change the administrative and territorial 
divisions of Mongolia at the suggestion by the Government;  
12) to determine the legal basis of the system, structure and 
activities of local self-governing and administrative bodies;  
13) to institute titles, orders, medals and higher military 
ranks; to determine the table of ranks in some special fields of 
State service;  
14) to issue acts of amnesty 
15) to ratify and denounce international agreements to 
which Mongolia is a Party; to establish and sever diplomatic 
relations with foreign State at the suggestion of the 
Government;  
16) to hold national referendums. To verify the validity of 
a referendum in which the majority of eligible citizens has 
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taken part, and to consider the question which has obtained 
majority votes as decided;  
17) to declare a state of war in case the sovereignty and 
independence of Mongolia are threatened by armed actions on 
the part of a foreign Power, and to abate it;  
18) to declare a state of emergency or martial law in the 
whole or some parts of the country in special circumstances 
described in Sections 2 and 3 of this Article, and to approve or 
nullify the President’s decree to that effect.  
2.Under the following extraordinary circumstances the State Great 
Hural may declare a state of emergency to eliminate the 
consequences thereof and to restore the life of the population 
and society to norm:  
1) natural disasters or other unforeseen dangers which have 
threatened or may threaten directly the life, health, well being 
and security of the population in the whole or a part of the 
country’s territory, occur; 
2) public authorities are not able within legal limits to cope 
with public disorders caused by organized, violent, illegal 
actions of any organization or a group of people threatening 
the constitutional order and the existence of the legitimate 
social system.  
3.The State Great Hural may declare martial law if public 
disorders in the whole or a part of the country’s territory result 
in an armed conflict or create a real threat of an armed 
conflict, or if there is an armed aggression or real threat of an 
aggression from outside.  
4.The other powers, structure and the procedures of the State 
Great Hural shall be defined by law.  
Article 26  
1.The President, members of the State Great Hural and the 
Government shall have the right to legislative initiate.  
2. Citizens and other organizations shall forward their suggestions 
on draft laws to those entitled to initiate a law.  
3.The State Great Hural shall officially promulgate national laws 
through publication and, if law does not provide otherwise, it 
shall be effective 10 days after the day of publication.  
Article 27  
1.The State Great Hural shall exercise its powers through its 
sessions and other organizational forms.  
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2.Regular sessions of the State Great Hural shall be convened 
once in six months and last not less than 75 working days on 
each occasion.  
3.Extraordinary sessions may be convened at the demand of more 
than one third of the members of the State Great Hural, and/or 
on the initiative of the President and the Chairman of the State 
Great Hural.  
4.The President shall convoke constituent session of the State 
Great Hural within 30 days following the elections. Other 
sessions shall be convoked by the Chairman of the State Great 
Hural.  
5.In case of the proclamation by the President of a state of 
emergency or war, the State Great Hural shall be convened for 
an extraordinary session within 72 hours without prior 
announcement.  
6.The presence of an overwhelming majority of the State Great 
Hural shall be required to consider a session valid, and 
decisions shall be taken by a majority of all members present 
if the Constitution and other laws do not provide otherwise.  
Article 28  
1.The State Great Hural shall have Standing Committees dealing 
with specific fields.  
2.The State Great Hural shall determine the competence, structure 
and procedures of the Standing Committees.  
Article 29  
1.Members of the State Great Hural shall be remunerated from the 
State budget during their tenure and shall not hold 
concurrently any posts and employment other than those 
assigned by law.  
2.Immunity of members of the State Great Hural shall be 
protected by law.  
3.If a question arises that a member of the State Great Hural is 
involved in a crime, it shall be considered by the session of the 
State Great Hural to decide on the suspension of his/her 
mandate. If the court proves the member in question to be 
guilty of crime, the State Great Hural shall terminate his/her 
membership in the legislature.  
II. The President of Mongolia  
Article 30 
1.The President of Mongolia shall be the Head of State and 
embodiment of the unity of the people.  
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2.An indigenous citizen of Mongolia who has attained the age of 
forty-five years and has permanently resided as a minimum 
for the last five years in Mongolia, shall be eligible for lection 
to the post of President for a term of four years. 
Article 31  
1.Presidential elections shall be conducted in two stages.  
2.Political parties which have obtained seats in the State Great 
Hural shall nominate individually or collectively Presidential 
candidates, one candidate per a party or coalition of parties.  
3.At the primary stage of the elections citizens of Mongolia 
eligible to vote shall participate in electing the President on 
the basis of universal, free direct suffrage by secret ballot.  
4.The State Great Hural shall consider the candidate who has 
obtained a majority of all votes cast in the first voting as 
elected, the President, and shall pass a law recognizing his/her 
mandate.  
5.If none of the candidates obtains a majority vote in the first 
round, second voting shall take place involving the two 
candidates who have obtained the largest number of votes in 
the first round. The candidate who a law recognizing his/her 
mandate shall be passed by the State Great Hural.  
6. If neither of the candidates wins in the second ballot, 
Presidential elections shall be held anew.  
7.The President can be re-elected only once.  
8. The President shall not be a member of the State Great Hural or 
the Government and shall not concurrently hold the post of the 
Prime Minister or any other posts and pursue any occupation 
not relating to his duties assigned by law. If the President 
holds another office or a post he/she shall be relieved of it 
from the date on which he/she is inaugurated.  
Article 32  
1.The mandate of the President shall become effective with an 
oath taken by him/her and shall expire with an oath taken by 
the newly elected President.  
2.Within 30 days after the election the President shall take an oath 
before the State Great Rural: “I swear that I shall guard and 
defend the independence and sovereignty of Mongolia, 
freedom of the people and national unity and I shall uphold 
and observe the Constitution and faithfully perform the duties 
of the President”.  
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Article 33  
1.The President enjoys the following prerogative rights:  
1) to veto, partially or wholly, laws and other decisions 
adopted by the State Great Hural. The laws or decisions shall 
remain in force if two thirds of the members of the State Great 
Hural present do not accept the President’s veto;  
2) to propose to the State Great Hural the candidature for 
the appointment to the post of Prime Minister in consultation 
with the majority party or parties in the State Great Hural if 
none of them has majority of seats, as well as to propose to the 
State Great Hural the dissolution of the Government;  
3) to instruct the Government on issues within his 
competence. If the President issues a relevant decree it shall 
become effective upon signature by the Prime Minister;  
4) to represent the Mongolian State in foreign and, in 
consultation with the State Great Hural, to conclude 
international treaties on behalf of Mongolia;  
5) to appoint and recall heads of plenipotentiary missions 
of Mongolia to foreign countries in consultation with the State 
Great Hural;  
6) to receive the Letters of Credence or Recall of Heads of 
diplomatic missions of foreign states in Mongolia;  
7) to confer state titles and higher military ranks and award 
orders and medals; 
8) to grant pardon;  
9) to decide matters related to granting and withdrawing 
Mongolian citizenship and granting asylum; 
10) to head the National Security Council of Mongolia; 
11) to declare general or partial conscription; 
12) to declare a state of emergency or martial law on the 
whole or a part of the national territory and to order the 
deployment of armed forces when extraordinary 
circumstances described in Sections 2 and 3 of Article 25 of 
this Constitution arise and the State Great Hural concurrently 
in recess, cannot be summoned at short notice. The State 
Great Hural shall consider within 7 days the presidential 
decree declaring a state of emergency or martial law and shall 
approve or disapprove it. If the State Great Hural does not 
take decision on the matter, the Presidential decree shall 
become null and void.  
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2.The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces of Mongolia.  
3.The President may address messages to the State Great Hural 
and/or to the people, he may at his own discretion attend 
sessions of the State Great Hural, report on and submit 
proposals concerning vital issues of domestic and foreign 
policies of the country.  
4.Other specific powers may be vested in the President only by 
law. 
Article 34  
1.The President within his powers shall issue decrees in 
conformity with law.  
2.If a Presidential decree is incompatible with law, the President 
himself or the State Great Hural shall invalidate it.  
Article 35  
1.The President shall be responsible to the State Great Hural.  
2.In case of a violation of the Constitution and/or abuse of power 
in breach of his oath, the President may be removed from his 
post on the basis of the finding of the Constitutional Court by 
an overwhelming majority of members of the State Great 
Hural present and voting.  
Article 36  
1.The person, residence and transport of the President shall be 
inviolable. 
2.Dignity and immunity of the President shall be protected by law.  
Article 37  
1.In the temporary absence of the President his full powers shall 
be exercised by the Chairman of the State Great Hural.  
2.In the event of the resignation, death or voluntary retirement of 
the President his full powers shall be exercised by the 
Chairman of the State Great Hural pending the inauguration of 
the newly elected President. In such a case the State Great 
Hural shall announce and hold Presidential elections within 
four months.  
3.The procedure of the discharge of Presidential duties by the 
Chairman of the State Great Hural shall be determined by law.  
III. The Government of Mongolia  
Article 38  
1.The Government of Mongolia is the highest executive body of 
the State.  
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2.In discharging the duty of directing economic, social and 
cultural development of the country in observance of State 
laws, the Government shall exercise the following powers:  
1) to organize and ensure nation-wide implementation of 
the Constitution and other laws;  
2) to work out a comprehensive policy on science and 
technology, guidelines for economic and social development, 
the State budget, credit and fiscal plans and to submit these to 
the State Great Hural and to execute decisions taken thereon;  
3) to elaborate and implement comprehensive measures on 
sectional, intersectoral, as well as regional development;  
4) to undertake measures on the protection of the 
environment and on the rational use and restoration of natural 
resources;  
5) to provide efficient leadership of central state 
administrative bodies and to direct the activities of local 
administrations;  
6) to strengthen the country’s defense capabilities and to 
ensure national security; 
7) to take measure for the protection of human rights and 
freedoms, enforcement of public order and prevention of 
crime;  
8) to realize the State foreign policy; 
9) to conclude and implement international treaties with 
the consent of and subsequent ratification by the State Great 
Hural as well as to conclude and abrogate intergovernmental 
treaties.  
3.The specific powers, structure and procedure of the Government 
shall be determined by law.  
Article 39  
1.The Government shall comprise the Prime Minister and 
members.  
2.The Prime Minister shall, in consultation with the President, 
submit his/her proposals on the structure and composition of 
the Government and on changes in these to the State Great 
Hural. 
3.The State Great Hural shall consider the candidatures proposed 
by the Prime Minister one by one and take decision on their 
appointment.  
Article 40  
1.The term of the mandate of the Government shall be four years.  
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2.The term of office of the Government shall start from the day of 
the appointment of the Prime Minister by the State Great 
Hural and terminate upon the appointment of a new Prime 
Minister.  
Article 41  
1.The Prime Minister shall lead the Government and shall be 
responsible to the State Great Hural for the implementation of 
State laws.  
2.The Government shall be accountable for its work to the State 
Great Hural.  
Article 42  
Personal immunity of the Prime Minister and members of the 
Government shall be protected by law.  
Article 43  
1.The Prime Minister may tender his/her resignation to the State 
Great Hural before the expiry of his/her term of office if 
he/she considers that the Government is unable to exercise its 
powers.  
2.The Government shall step down in its entirety upon the 
resignation of the Prime Minister or if half of the members of 
the Government resign at the same time.  
3.The State Great Hural shall consider the matter and make a final 
decision within 15 days after taking initiative to dissolve the 
Government or receiving the President’s proposal or the Prime 
Minister’s statement on resignation.  
4. The State Great Hural shall consider and take decision on the 
dissolution of the Government if not less than one fourth of 
the members of the State Great Hural formally proposes the 
dissolution of the Government.  
Article 44  
If the Government submits a draft resolution requesting a vote of 
confidence, the State Great Hural shall proceed with the matter in 
accordance with Section 3 of Article 43.  
Article 45 
1.The Government shall, in conformity with legislation, issue 
resolutions and ordinances which shall be signed by the Prime 
Minister and the Minister concerned.  
2.If these resolutions and ordinances are incompatible with laws 
and regulations, the Government itself or the State Great 
Hural shall invalidate them.  
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Article 46  
1.Ministries and other government offices of Mongolia shall be 
constituted in accordance with law.  
2.State employees shall be Mongolian nationals. They shall 
strictly abide by the Constitution and other laws and work for 
the benefit of the people and in the interest of the State.  
3.The working conditions and social guarantees of state 
employees shall be determined by law.  
IV. THE JUDICIARY 
Article 47  
1.The judicial power shall be vested exclusively in courts.  
2.Unlawful institution of courts under any circumstances and 
exercise of judicial power by any other organization but courts 
shall be prohibited.  
3.Courts shall be instituted solely under the Constitution and other 
laws.  
Article 48  
1.The judicial system shall consist of the Supreme Court, Aimag 
and capital city courts, Soum, intersoum and district courts. 
Specialized courts such as criminal, civil and administrative 
courts may be formed. The activities and decisions of the 
specialized courts shall not but be under the supervision of the 
Supreme Court.  
2.The structure of courts and the legal basis of their activities shall 
be defined by law.  
3.The courts shall be financed from the State budget. The State 
shall ensure economic guarantee of the courts activities.  
Article 49  
1.Judges shall be independent and subject only to law.  
2.Neither a private person nor any civil officer be it the President, 
Prime Minister, members of the State Great Hural or the 
Government, officials of political parties or other voluntary 
organizations shall not interfere with the exercise by the 
judges of their duties. 
3.A General Council of Courts shall function for the purposes of 
ensuring the independence of the judiciary. 
4.The General Council of Courts, without interfering in the 
activities of courts and judges, shall deal exclusively with the 
selection of judges from among lawyers, protection of their 
rights and other matters pertaining to the ensurance of 
conditions guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary. 
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5.The structure and procedures of the General Council of Courts 
shall be defined by law. 
Article 50 
1.The Supreme Court shall be the highest judicial organ and shall 
exercise the following powers: 
1) to try at first instance criminal cases and legal disputes 
under its jurisdiction; 
2) to examine decisions of lower-instance courts through 
appeal and supervision; 
3) to examine and take decision on matters related to the 
protection of law and human rights and freedoms therein and 
transferred to it by the Constitutional Court and the Prosecutor 
General; 
4) to provide official interpretations for correct application 
of all other laws except the Constitution; 
5) to make judgments on all other matters assigned to it by 
law. 
2.The decision made by the Supreme Court shall be final judiciary 
decision and shall be binding upon all courts and other 
persons. If a decision made by the Supreme Court is 
incompatible with a law, the Supreme Court itself shall have 
to repeal it. If an interpretation made by the Supreme Court is 
incompatible with a law, the latter shall have precedence. 
3.The Supreme Court and other courts shall have no right to apply 
laws that are unconstitutional or have not been promulgated. 
Article 51 
1.The Supreme Court shall comprise the Chief Justice and judges. 
2.The President shall appoint the judges of the Supreme Court 
upon their presentation to the State Great Hural by the General 
Council of Courts, and appoint judges of other courts on the 
proposal of the General Council of Courts. 
3.A Mongolian national of thirty-five years of age with higher 
education in law and a professional career or not less than 10 
years may be appointed a judge of the Supreme Court. A 
Mongolian national of twenty-five years of age with higher 
education in law and a professional career of not less than 
three years may be appointed judge of the other courts. 
4.Removal of a judge of a court of any instance shall be prohibited 
except in cases he/she is relieved at his/her own request or 
removed on the grounds provided for in the Constitution 
and/or the law on the judiciary and by a valid court decision. 
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Article 52 
1.Courts of all instances shall consider and make judgment on 
cases and disputes on the basis of collective decision-making.  
2.In passing a collective decision on cases and disputes, the courts 
of first instance shall allow representatives of citizens to 
participate in the proceedings in accordance with the 
procedures prescribed by law.  
3.A judge alone may take decision on some cases which are 
specifically singled out by law.  
Article 53 
1.Court trials shall be conducted in the Mongolian language.  
2.A person who does not know Mongolian shall be acquainted 
with all facts of the case through translation and shall have the 
right to use his/her native language at the trial.  
Article 54  
1.Court trials shall be open to the public except in cases 
specifically singled out by law.  
Article 55  
1.The accused shall have a right to defense.  
2.The accused shall be accorded legal assistance according to law 
and at his/her request.  
Article 56  
1.The Prosecutor shall exercise supervision over the inquiry into 
and investigation of cases and the execution of punishment, 
and participate in the court proceedings on behalf of the State.  
2.The President shall appoint the State Prosecutor General and 
his/her deputies in consultation with the State Great Hural for 
a term of six years.  
3.The system, structure and legal basis of the activities of the 
Prosecutor’s Office shall be determined by law.  
CHAPTER FOUR  
Administrative and Territorial Units and their Governing Bodies  
Article 57 
1.The territory of Mongolia shall be divided administratively into 
Aimags and a capital city; Aimags shall be subdivided into 
Soums; Soums into Baghs; the capital city shall be divided 
into districts and districts into Horoos.  
2.Legal status of towns and villages located on the territories of 
administrative divisions shall be defined by law.  
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3.Revision of an administrative and territorial unit shall be 
considered and decided by the State Great Hural on the basis 
of a proposal by a respective local Hural and local population, 
and with account taken of the country’s economic structure 
and the distribution of the population.  
Article 58 
1.Aimag, the capital city, Soum and district are administrative, 
territorial and socio-economic complexes with their functions 
and administrations provided for by law.  
2.Borderlines of Aimags, the capital city, Soums and districts shall 
be approved by the State Great Hural at the suggestion of the 
Government.  
Article 59  
1.Governance of administrative and territorial units of Mongolia 
shall be organized on the basis of combination of the 
principles of both self-government and central government.  
2.The self-governing bodies in Aimag, capital city, Soum and 
district shall be Hurals of Representatives of the citizens of 
respective territories; in Bagh and Horoo-General Meetings of 
citizens. In between the sessions of the Hurals and General 
Meetings their Presidiums shall assume administrative 
functions.  
3.Hurals of Aimags and the capital city shall be elected for a term 
of four years. The memberships of these Hurals as well as 
those of Soums and districts, and the procedure of their 
election shall be determined by law.  
Article 60  
1.State power shall be exercised on the territories of Aimags, the 
capital city, Soums, districts, Baghs and Horoos by their 
respective Governors.  
2.Candidates for Governors are nominated by the Hurals of 
respective Aimags, the capital city, Soums, districts, Baghs 
and Horoos. Governors of Aimags and the capital city are 
appointed by the Prime Minister; Soums and .district 
Governors by the Governors of Aimags and the capital city; 
Governors of Baghs and Horoos by the Governors of Soums 
and districts respectively for a term of four years.  
3.In case the Prime Minister and Governors of higher levels refuse 
to appoint the gubernatorial candidates, new nominations shall 
be held in the manner prescribed in Section 2 of this Article. 
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Pending the appointment of a new Governor the previously 
appointed Governor shall exercise his/her mandate.  
Article 61  
1.While working for the implementation of the decisions of a 
respective Hural, a Governor, as a representative of State 
power, shall be responsible to the Government and the 
Governor of higher instance for proper observance of national 
laws and fulfillment of the decisions of the Government and 
the respective superior body in his/her territory.  
2.Governor shall have a right to veto decisions of respective 
Aimag, capital city, Soum, district, Bagh and Horoo Hurals.  
3.If a Hural by a majority vote overrides the veto, the Governor 
may tender his/her resignation to the Prime Minister or to the 
Governor of higher instance if he/she considers that he/she is 
not able to implement the decision concerned.  
4.Governors of Aimag, the capital city, Soum and district shall 
have secretariats/Offices of the Seal. The Government shall 
determine the structure and size of these offices individually 
or by a uniform standard.  
Article 62  
1.Local self-governing bodies besides making independent 
decisions on matters of socio-economic life of the respective 
Aimag, the capital city, Soum, district, Bagh and Horoo shall 
organize the participation of the population in solving 
problems of national scale and that of larger territorial 
divisions.  
2.Authorities of higher instance shall not take decision on matters 
coming under the jurisdiction of local self-governing bodies. 
If, law and decisions of respective superior state organs do not 
specifically deal with definite local matters, local self-
governing bodies can decide upon them independently in 
conformity with the Constitution.  
3.If the State Great Hural and Government deem it necessary they 
may delegate some matters within their competence to the 
Aimag and capital city Hurals Governors for their solution.  
Article 63 
1.Hurals of Aimag, the capital city, Soum, district, Bagh and 
Horoo shall adopt resolutions and Governors shall issue 
ordinances within their competence.  
2.Resolutions of the Hurals and Ordinances of the Governors shall 
be in conformity with law, Presidential decrees and decisions 
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of the Government and other superior bodies, and shall be 
binding within their respective territories.  
3.Administrative and territorial units, and the powers, structure 
and procedure of their governing bodies shall be determined 
by law.  
CHAPTER FIVE 
The Constitution Tsets of Mongolia  
Article 64  
1.The constitutional Tsets shall be an organ exercising supreme 
supervision over the implementation of the Constitution, 
making judgment on the violation of its provisions and 
resolving constitutional disputes. It shall be the guarantee for 
the strict observance of the Constitution.  
2.The Constitutional Tsets and its members in the execution of 
their duties shall be subject to the Constitution only and shall 
be independent of any organizations, officials or anybody else.  
3.The independence of the members of the Constitutional Tsets 
shall be ensured by the guarantees set out in the Constitution 
and other laws.  
Article 65  
1.The Constitutional Tsets shall consist of 9 members. Members 
of the Constitutional Tsets shall be appointed by the State 
Great Hural for a term of six years upon the nomination of 
three of them by the State Great Hural, three by the President 
and the remaining three by the Supreme Court.  
2.A member of the Constitutional Tsets shall be a Mongolian 
national who has reached forty years of age and is experienced 
in politics and law.  
3.The Chairman of the Constitutional Tsets shall be elected from 
among 9 members for a term of three years by a majority vote 
of the members of Constitutional Tsets. He may be re-elected 
once.  
4.If the Chairman or a member of the Constitutional Tsets violates 
law, he/she may be withdrawn by the State Great Hural on the 
basis of the decision of the Constitutional Tsets and on the 
opinion of the institution which nominated him/her.  
5.The President, members of the State Great Hural, the Prime 
Minister, members of the Government and members of the 
Supreme Court shall not be nominated to serve on the 
Constitutional Tsets.  
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Article 66  
1.The Constitutional Tsets shall examine and settle constitutional 
disputes at the request of the State Great Hural, the President, 
the Prime Minister, the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor 
General and/or on its own initiative on the basis of petitions 
and information received citizens.  
2.The Constitutional Tsets in accordance with Section 1 of this 
Article shall make and submit judgment to the State Great 
Hural on:  
1) the conformity of laws, decrees and other decisions by 
the State Great Hural and the President, as well as 
Government decisions and international treaties signed by 
Mongolia with the Constitution;  
2) the conformity of national referendums and decisions of 
the Central election authority on the elections of the State 
Great Hural and its members as well as on Presidential 
elections with the Constitution; 
3) the breach of law by the President, Chairman and 
members of the State Great Hural, the Prime Minister, 
members of the Government, the Chief Justice and the 
Prosecutor General;  
4) the well-foundedness of the grounds for the removal of 
the President, Chairman of the State Great Hural and the 
Prime Minister and for the recall of members of the State 
Great Hural.  
3.If a decision submitted in accordance with Clauses 1 and 2 of 
Section 2 of this Article is not acceptable to the State Great 
Hural, the Constitutional Tsets shall re-examine it and make 
final judgment.  
4.If the Constitutional Tsets decides that the laws, decrees and 
other decisions of the State Great Hural and the President as 
well as Government decisions and international treaties 
concluded by Mongolia are incongruous with the Constitution, 
the laws, decrees, instruments of ratification and decisions in 
questions shall be considered invalid.  
Article 67 
Decisions of the Constitutional Tsets shall immediately enter into 
force. 
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 CHAPTER SIX  
Amendment of the Constitution of Mongolia  
Article 68 
1.Amendments to the Constitution may be initiated by 
organizations and officials enjoying the right to legislative 
initiative and /or proposed by the Constitutional Court to the 
State Great Hural.  
2 A national referendum on constitutional amendment nay be held 
on the concurrence of not less than two thirds of the members 
of the State Great Hural. The referendum shall be held in 
accordance with the provisions of Clause 16, Section 1, 
Article 25 of the Constitution.  
Article 69  
1.An amendment to the Constitution shall be adopted by not less 
than three fourths of votes of all members of the State Great 
Hural.  
2. A draft amendment to the Constitution which has twice failed to 
win three fourths of votes of all members of the State Great 
Hural shall not be subject to consideration until the State 
Great Hural sits in a new composition following general 
elections.  
3.The State Great Hural shall not undertake amendment of the 
Constitution within 6 months pending the next general 
elections.  
4.Amendment which have been adopted shall be of the same force 
as the Constitution.  
Article 70  
1.Laws, decrees and other decisions of state bodies, and activities 
of all other organizations and citizens should be in full 
conformity with the Constitution.  
2.This Constitution of Mongolia shall enter into force at 12.00 
hours on the 12th of February of 1992, or at the hour of Horse 
on the prime and benevolent ninth day of Yellow Horse of the 
first spring month of Black Tiger of the year of Water Monkey 
of the Seventeenth 60-year Cycle.  
Learn and Abide.  
THE GREAT PEOPLE’S HURAL OF THE MONGOLIAN 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC  
11.35 a.m. Ulaanbaatar  
13 January 1992 
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